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Abstract
The Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students (spa-s) comprises
three sets of agents, namely students, projects and lecturers, where students have preferences over
projects and lecturers have preferences over students. In this scenario we seek a stable matching,
that is, an assignment of students to projects such that there is no student and lecturer who
have an incentive to deviate from their assignee/s. We study spa-st, the extension of spa-s
in which the preference lists of students and lecturers need not be strictly ordered, and may
contain ties. In this scenario, stable matchings may be of different sizes, and it is known that
max spa-st, the problem of finding a maximum stable matching in spa-st, is NP-hard. We
present a linear-time 32 -approximation algorithm for max spa-st and an Integer Programming
(IP) model to solve max spa-st optimally. We compare the approximation algorithm with the
IP model experimentally using randomly-generated data. We find that the performance of the
approximation algorithm easily surpassed the 32 bound, constructing a stable matching within
92% of optimal in all cases, with the percentage being far higher for many instances.
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1 Introduction
Background and motivation. In universities all over the world, students need to be
assigned to projects as part of their degree programmes. Lecturers typically offer a range
of projects, and students may rank a subset of the available projects in preference order.
Lecturers may have preferences over students, or over the projects they offer, or they may
not have explicit preferences at all. There may also be capacity constraints on the maximum
numbers of students that can be allocated to each project and lecturer. The problem of
allocating students to projects subject to these preference and capacity constraints is called
the Student-Project Allocation problem (spa) [8, Section 5.5][4, 5]. Variants of this problem
can be defined for the cases that lecturers have preferences over the students that rank their
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8:2 A 32 -approximation algorithm for the Student-Project Allocation problem
projects [2], or over the projects they offer [10], or not at all [7]. In this paper we focus
on the first of these cases, where lecturers have preferences over students – the so-called
Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students (spa-s).
Finding an optimal allocation of students to projects manually is time-consuming and error-
prone. Consequently many universities automate the allocation process using a centralised
algorithm. Given the typical sizes of problem instances (e.g., 130 students at the University
of Glasgow, School of Computing Science), the efficiency of the matching algorithm is of
paramount importance. In the case of spa-s, the desired matching must be stable with
respect to the given preference lists, meaning that no student and lecturer have an incentive
to deviate from the given allocation and form an assignment with one another [11].
Abraham et al. [2] described a linear-time algorithm to find a stable matching in an
instance I of spa-s when all preference lists in I are strictly ordered. They also showed that,
under this condition, all stable matchings in I are of the same size. In this paper we focus on
the variant of spa-s in which preference lists of students and lecturers can contain ties, which
we refer to as the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students
including Ties (spa-st). Ties allow both students and lecturers to express indifference in
their preference lists (in practice, for example, lecturers may be unable to distinguish between
certain groups of students). A stable matching in an instance of spa-st can be found in
linear time by breaking the ties arbitrarily and using the algorithm of Abraham et al. [2].
The Stable Marriage problem with Ties and Incomplete lists (smti) is a special case of
spa-st in which each project and lecturer has capacity 1, and each lecturer offers one project.
Given an instance of smti, it is known that stable matchings can have different sizes [9], and
thus the same is true for spa-st. Yet in practical applications it is desirable to match as
many students to projects as possible. This motivates max spa-st, the problem of finding a
maximum (cardinality) stable matching in an instance of spa-st. This problem is NP-hard,
since the corresponding optimisation problem restricted to smti, which we refer to as max
smti, is NP-hard [9]. Király [6] described a 32 -approximation algorithm for max smti. He
also showed how to extend this algorithm to the case of the Hospitals-Residents problem with
Ties (hrt), where hrt is the special case of spa-st in which each lecturer l offers one project
p, and the capacities of l and p are equal. Yanagisawa [12] showed that max smti is not
approximable within a factor of 3329 unless P=NP; the same bound applies to max spa-st.
Our contribution. In this paper we describe a linear-time 32 -approximation algorithm for
max spa-st. This algorithm is a non-trivial extension of Király’s approximation algorithm
for hrt as mentioned above. We also describe an Integer Programming (IP) model to solve
max spa-st optimally. Through a series of experiments on randomly-generated data, we then
compare the sizes of stable matchings output by our approximation algorithm with the sizes
of optimal solutions obtained from our IP model. Our main finding is that the performance
of the approximation algorithm easily surpassed the 32 bound on the generated instances,
constructing a stable matching within 92% of optimal in all cases, with the percentage being
far higher for many instances.
Note that a natural “cloning” technique, involving transforming an instance I of spa-st
into an instance I ′ of smti, and then using Király’s 32 -approximation algorithm for smti [6]
in order to obtain a similar approximation in spa-st, does not work in general, as we show
in Appendix A. This motivates the need for a bespoke algorithm for the spa-st case.
Structure of this paper. Section 2 gives a formal definition of spa-st. Section 3 describes
the 32 -approximation algorithm, and the IP model for max spa-st is given in Section 4. The
experimental evaluation is described in Section 5, and Section 6 discusses future work.
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2 Formal definition of spa-st
An instance I of spa-st comprises a set S = {s1, s2, ..., sn1} of students, a set P =
{p1, p2, ..., pn2} of projects, and a set L = {l1, l2, ..., ln3} of lecturers. Each project is offered by
one lecturer, and each lecturer lk offers a set of projects Pk ⊆ P , where P1, . . . , Pk partitions
P . Each project pj ∈ P has a capacity cj ∈ Z+0 , and similarly each lecturer lk ∈ L has a
capacity dk ∈ Z+0 . Each student si ∈ S has a set Ai ⊆ P of acceptable projects that they
rank in order of preference. Ties are allowed in preference lists, where a tie t in a student
si’s list indicates that si is indifferent between all projects in t. Each lecturer lk ∈ L has a
preference list over the students si for which Ai ∩ Pk 6= ∅. Ties may also exist in lecturer
preference lists. The rank of project pj on student si’s list, denoted rank(si, pj), is defined
as 1 plus the number of projects that si strictly prefers to pj . An analogous definition exists
for the rank of a student on a lecturer’s list, denoted rank(lk, si).
An assignment M in I is a subset of S ×P such that, for each pair (si, pj) ∈M , pj ∈ Ai,
that is, si finds pj acceptable. Let M(si) denote the set of projects assigned to a student
si ∈ S, let M(pj) denote the set of students assigned to a project pj ∈ P , and let M(lk)
denote the set of students assigned to projects in Pk for a given lecturer lk ∈ L. A matching
M is an assignment such that |M(si)| ≤ 1 for all si ∈ S, |M(pj)| ≤ cj for all pj ∈ P and
|M(lk)| ≤ dk for all lk ∈ L. If si ∈ S is assigned in a matching M , we let M(si) denote si’s
assigned project, otherwise M(si) is empty.
Given a matching M in I, let (si, pj) ∈ (S ×P )\M be a student-project pair, where pj is
offered by lecturer lk. Then (si, pj) is a blocking pair of M [2] if 1, 2 and 3 hold as follows:
1. si finds pj acceptable;
2. si either prefers pj to M(si) or is unassigned in M ;
3. Either a, b or c holds as follows:
a. pj is undersubscribed (i.e., |M(pj)| < cj) and lk is undersubscribed (i.e., |M(lk)| < dk);
b. pj is undersubscribed, lk is full and either si ∈ M(lk) or lk prefers si to the worst
student in M(lk);
c. pj is full and lk prefers si to the worst student in M(pj).
Let (si, pj) be a blocking pair of M . Then we say that (si, pj) is of type (3x) if 1, 2 and
3x are true in the above definition, where x ∈ {a, b, c}. In order to more easily describe
certain stages of the approximation algorithm, blocking pairs of type (3b) are split into two
subtypes as follows. (3bi) defines a blocking pair of type (3b) where si is already assigned to
another project of lk’s. (3bii) defines a blocking pair of type (3b) where this is not the case.
A matching M in an instance I of spa-st is stable if it admits no blocking pair. Define
max spa-st to be the problem of finding a maximum stable matching in spa-st and let
Mopt denote a maximum stable matching for a given instance. Similarly, let min spa-st be
the problem of finding a minimum stable matching in spa-st.
3 Approximation algorithm
3.1 Introduction and preliminary definitions
We begin by defining key terminology before describing the approximation algorithm itself
in Section 3.2, which is a non-trivial extension of Király’s hrt algorithm [6].
A student si ∈ S is either in phase 1, 2 or 3. In phase 1 there are still projects on si’s list
that they have not applied to. In phase 2, si has iterated once through their list and are
doing so again whilst a priority is given to si on each lecturer’s preference list, compared to
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other students who tie with si. In phase 3, si is considered unassigned and carries out no
more applications. A project pj is fully available if pj and lk are both undersubscribed, where
lecturer lk offers pj . A student si meta-prefers project pj1 to pj2 if either (i) rank(si, pj1) <
rank(si, pj2), or (ii) rank(si, pj1) = rank(si, pj2) and pj1 is fully available, whereas pj2 is not.
In phase 1 or 2, si may be either available, provisionally assigned or confirmed. Student si
is available if they are not assigned to a project. Student si is provisionally assigned if si
has been assigned in phase 1 and there is a project still on si’s list that meta-prefers to pj .
Otherwise, si is confirmed.
If a student si is a provisionally assigned to project pj , then (si, pj) is said to be precarious.
A project pj is precarious if it is assigned a student si such that (si, pj) is precarious. A
lecturer is precarious if they offer a project pj that is precarious. Lecturer lk meta-prefers si1
to si2 if either (i) rank(lk, si1) < rank(lk, si2), or (ii) rank(lk, si1) = rank(lk, si2) and si1 is in
phase 2, whereas si2 is not. The favourite projects Fi of a student si are defined as the set of
projects on si’s preference list for which there is no other project on si’s list meta-preferred
to any project in Fi. A worst assignee of lecturer lk is defined to be a student in M(lk) of
worst rank, with priority given to phase 1 students over phase 2 students. Similarly, a worst
assignee of lecturer lk in M(pj) is defined to be a student in M(pj) of worst rank, prioritising
phase 1 over phase 2 students, where lk offers pj .
We remark that some of the above terms such as favourite and precarious have been
defined for the spa-st setting by extending the definitions of the corresponding terms as
given by Király in the hrt context [6].
3.2 Description of the algorithm
Algorithm 1 begins with an empty matching M which will be built up over the course of
the algorithm’s execution. All students are initially set to be available and in phase 1. The
algorithm proceeds as follows. While there are still available students in phase 1 or 2, choose
some such student si. Student si applies to a favourite project pj at the head of their list,
that is, there is no project on si’s list that si meta-prefers to pj . Let lk be the lecturer who
offers pj . We consider the following cases.
If pj and lk are both undersubscribed then (si, pj) is added to M . Clearly if (si, pj) were
not added to M , it would potentially be a blocking pair of type (3a).
If pj is undersubscribed, lk is full and lk is precarious where precarious pair (si′ , pj′) ∈M
for some project p′j offered by lk, then we remove (si′ , pj′) from M and add pair (si, pj).
This notion of precariousness allows us to find a stable matching of sufficient size even
when there are ties in student preference lists (there may also be ties in lecturer preference
lists). Allowing a pair (si′ , pj′) ∈ M to be precarious means that we are noting that
si′ has other fully available project options in their preference list at equal rank to pj′ .
Hence, if another student applies to pj′ when pj′ is full, or to a project offered by lk
where lk is full, we allow this assignment to happen removing (si′ , pj′) from M , since
there is a chance that the size of the resultant matching could be increased.
If on the other hand pj is undersubscribed, lk is full and lk meta-prefers si to a worst
assignee si′ , where (si′ , pj′) ∈ M for some project pj′ offered by lk, then we remove
(si′ , pj′) fromM and add pair (si, pj). It makes intuitive sense that if lk is full and gets an
offer to an undersubscribed project from a student si that they prefer to a worst assigned
student si′ , then lk would want to remove si′ from pj′ and take on si for pj′ . Student si′
will subsequently remove pj′ from their preference list as lk will not want to assign to
them on re-application. This is done via the Remove-pref method (Algorithm 2).
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Algorithm 1 3/2-approximation algorithm for spa-st
Require: An instance I of spa-st
Ensure: Return a stable matching M where |M | ≥ 23 |Mopt|
1: M ← ∅
2: all students are initially set to be available and in phase 1
3: while there exists an available student si ∈ S who is in phase 1 or 2 do
4: let lk be the lecturer who offers pj
5: si applies to a favourite project pj ∈ A(si)
6: if pj is fully available then
7: M ←M ∪ {(si, pj)}
8: else if pj is undersubscribed, lk is full and (lk is precarious or lk meta-prefers si to
a worst assignee) then . according to the worst assignee definition in Section 3.1
9: if lk is precarious then
10: let pj′ be a project in Pk such that there exists (si′ , pj′) ∈M that is precarious
11: else . lk is not precarious
12: let si′ be a worst assignee of lk such that lk meta-prefers si to si′ and let
pj′ =M(si′)
13: Remove-Pref(si′ , pj′)
14: end if
15: M ←M\{(si′ , pj′)}
16: M ←M ∪ {(si, pj)}
17: else if pj is full and (pj is precarious or lk meta-prefers si to a worst assignee in
M(pj)) then
18: if pj is precarious then
19: identify a student si′ ∈M(pj) such that (si′ , pj) is precarious
20: else . pj is not precarious
21: let si′ be a worst assignee of lk in M(pj) such that lk meta-prefers si to si′
22: Remove-Pref(si′ , pj)
23: end if
24: M ←M\{(si′ , pj)}
25: M ←M ∪ {(si, pj)}
26: else
27: Remove-Pref(si, pj)
28: end if
29: end while
30: Promote-students(M)
31: return M ;
If pj is full and precarious then pair (si, pj) is added to M while precarious pair (si′ , pj)
is removed. As before, this allows si′ to potentially assign to other fully available projects
at the same rank as pj on their list. Since si′ does not remove pj from their preference
list, si′ will get another chance to assign to pj if these other applications to fully available
projects at the same rank are not successful.
If pj is full and lk meta-prefers si to a worst assignee si′ in M(pj), then pair (si, pj) is
added toM while (si′ , pj) is removed. As this lecturer’s project is full (and not precarious)
the only time they will want to add a student si to this project (meaning the removal
of another student) is if si is preferred to a worst student si′ assigned to that project.
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Algorithm 2 Remove-Pref(si, pj) – remove a project from a student’s preference list
Require: An instance I of spa-st and a student si and project pj
Ensure: Return an instance I where pj is removed from si’s preference list
1: remove pj from si’s preference list
2: if si’s preference list is empty then
3: reinstate si’s preference list
4: if si is in phase 1 then
5: move si to phase 2
6: else if si is in phase 2 then
7: move si to phase 3
8: end if
9: end if
10: return instance I
Algorithm 3 Promote-students(M) – remove all blocking pairs of type (3bi)
Require: SPA-ST instance I and matching M that does not contain blocking pairs of type
(3a), (3bii) or (3c).
Ensure: Return a stable matching M .
1: while there are still blocking pairs of type (3bi) do
2: Let (si, pj′) be a blocking pair of type (3bi)
3: M ←M\{(si,M(si))}
4: M ←M ∪ {(si, pj′)}
5: end while
6: return M
Similar to before, si′ will not subsequently be able to assign to this project and so removes
it from their preference list via the Remove-pref method (Algorithm 2).
When removing a project from a student si’s preference list (the Remove-pref operation
of Algorithm 2), if si has removed all projects from their preference list and is in phase 1
then their preference list is reinstated and they are set to be in phase 2. If on the other
hand they were already in phase 2, then they are set to be in phase 3 and are hence inactive.
The proof that Algorithm 1 produces a stable matching (see Appendix B) relies only on
the fact that a student iterates once through their preference list. Allowing students to
iterate through their preference lists a second time when in phase 2 allows us to find a stable
matching of sufficient size when there are ties in lecturer preference lists (there may also be
ties in student preference lists). This is due to the meta-prefers definition where a lecturer
favours one student si over another si′ if they are the same rank and si is in phase 2 whereas
si′ is not. Similar to above, this then allows si to steal a position from si′ with the chance
that si′ may find another assignment and increase the size of the resultant matching.
After the main while loop has terminated, the final part of the algorithm begins where all
blocking pairs of type (3bi) are removed using the Promote-students method (Algorithm 3).
3.3 Proof of correctness
I Theorem 1. Let M be a matching found by Algorithm 1 for an instance I of spa-st. Then
M is stable and |M | ≥ 23 |Mopt|, where Mopt is a maximum stable matching in I.
Proof. Theorems 18, 22 and Theorem 30, proved in Appendix B, show that M is stable, and
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that Algorithm 1 runs in polynomial time and has performance guarantee 32 . The proofs
required for this algorithm are naturally longer and more complex than given by Király [6]
for smti, as spa-st generalises smti to the case that lecturers can offer multiple projects,
and projects and lecturers may have capacities greater than 1. These extensions add extra
components to the definition of a blocking pair (given in Section 2) which in turn adds
complexity to the algorithm and its proof of correctness. J
Appendix B.5 shows a simple example instance where a matching found by Algorithm 1
is exactly 23 times the optimal size, hence the analysis of the performance guarantee is tight.
4 IP model
In this section we present an IP model for max spa-st. For the stability constraints in
the model, it is advantageous to use an equivalent condition for stability, as given by the
following lemma, whose proof can be found in Appendix C.
I Lemma 2. Let I be an instance of SPA-ST and let M be a matching in I. Then M is
stable if and only if the following condition, referred to as condition (*) holds: For each
student si ∈ S and project pj ∈ P , if si is unassigned in M and finds pj acceptable, or si
prefers pj to M(si), then either:
lk is full, si /∈ M(lk) and lk prefers the worst student in M(lk) to si or is indifferent
between them, or;
pj is full and lk prefers the worst student in M(pj) to si or is indifferent between them,
where lk is the lecturer offering pj.
The key variables in the model are binary-valued variables xij , defined for each si ∈ S
and pj ∈ P , where xij = 1 if and only if student si is assigned to project pj . Additionally, we
have binary-valued variables αij and βij for each si ∈ S and pj ∈ P . These variables allow
us to more easily describe the stability constraints below. For each si ∈ S and lk ∈ L, let
Tik = {su ∈ S : rank(lk, su) ≤ rank(lk, si) ∧ su 6= si}.
That is, Tik is the set of students ranked at least as highly as student si in lecturer lk’s
preference list not including si. Also, for each pj ∈ P , let
Tijk = {su ∈ S : rank(lk, su) ≤ rank(lk, si) ∧ su 6= si ∧ pj ∈ A(su)}.
That is, Tijk is the set of students su ranked at least as highly as student si in lecturer
lk’s preference list, such that project pj is acceptable to su, not including si. Finally, let
Sij = {pr ∈ P : rank(si, pr) ≤ rank(si, pj)}, that is, Sij is the set of projects ranked at least
as highly as project pj in student si’s preference list, including pj . Figure 1 shows the IP
model for max spa-st.
Equation (1) enforces xij = 0 if si finds pj unacceptable. Inequality (2) ensures that
a student may be assigned to a maximum of one project. Inequalities (3) and (4) ensure
that project and lecturer capacities are enforced. In the left hand side of Inequality (5), if
1−∑pr∈Sij xir = 1, then either si is unmatched or si prefers pj to M(si). This also ensures
that either αij = 1 or βij = 1, described in Inequalities (6) and (7). Inequality (6) ensures
that, if αij = 1, the number of students ranked at least as highly as student si by lk (not
including si) and assigned to lk must be at least lk’s capacity dk. Inequality (7) ensures that,
if βij = 1, the number of students ranked at least as highly as student si in lecturer lk’s
preference list (not including si) and assigned to pj must be at least pj ’s capacity cj .
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maximise:
∑
si∈S
∑
pj∈P
xij
subject to:
1. xij = 0 ∀si ∈ S ∀pj ∈ P , pj /∈ A(si)
2.
∑
pj∈P
xij ≤ 1 ∀si ∈ S
3.
∑
si∈S
xij ≤ cj ∀pj ∈ P
4.
∑
si∈S
∑
pj∈Pk
xij ≤ dk ∀lk ∈ L
5. 1−
∑
pr∈Sij
xir ≤ αij + βij ∀si ∈ S ∀pj ∈ P
6.
∑
su∈Tik
∑
pr∈Pk
xur ≥ dkαij ∀si ∈ S ∀pj ∈ P
7.
∑
su∈Tijk
xuj ≥ cjβij ∀si ∈ S ∀pj ∈ P
xij ∈ {0, 1}, αij ∈ {0, 1}, βij ∈ {0, 1} ∀si ∈ S ∀pj ∈ P
Figure 1 IP model for max spa-st.
Finally, for our optimisation we maximise the sum of all xij variables in order to maximise
the number of students assigned. The following result, proved in Appendix C, establishes
the correctness of the IP model.
I Theorem 3. Given an instance I of spa-st, let J be the IP model as defined in Figure 1.
A maximum stable matching in I corresponds to an optimal solution in J and vice versa.
5 Experimental evaluation
5.1 Methodology
Experiments were conducted on the approximation algorithm and the IP model using
randomly-generated data in order to measure the effects on matching statistics when changing
parameter values relating to (1) instance size, (2) probability of ties in preference lists, and (3)
preference list lengths. Two further experiments (referred to as (4) and (5) below) explored
scalability properties for both techniques. Instances were generated using both existing and
new software. The existing software is known as the Matching Algorithm Toolkit and is a
collaborative project developed by students and staff at the University of Glasgow.
For a given spa-st instance, let the total project and lecturer capacities be denoted by
cP and dL, respectively. Note that these capacities were distributed randomly, subject to
there being a maximum difference of 1 between the capacities of any two projects or any two
lecturers (to ensure uniformity). The minimum and maximum size of student preference lists
is given by lmin and lmax, and ts represents the probability that a project on a student’s
preference list is tied with the next project. Lecturer preference lists were generated initially
from the student preference lists, where a lecturer lk must rank a student if a student ranks
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a project offered by lk. These lists were randomly shuffled and tl denotes the ties probability
for lecturer preference lists. A linear distribution was used to make some projects more
popular than others and in all experiments the most popular project is around 5 times more
popular than the least. This distribution influenced the likelihood of a student finding a
given project acceptable. Parameter details for each experiment are given below.
(1) Increasing instance size: 10 sets of 10, 000 instances were created (labelled SIZE1,
..., SIZE10). The number of students n1 increased from 100 to 1000 in steps of 100, with
n2 = 0.6n1, n3 = 0.4n1, cP = 1.4n1, dL = 1.2n1. The probabilities of ties in preference
lists were ts = tl = 0.2 throughout all instance sets. Lengths of preference lists lmin = 3
and lmax = 5 also remained the same and were kept low to ensure a wide variability in
stable matching size per instance.
(2) Increasing probability of ties: 11 sets of 10, 000 instances were created (labelled
TIES1, ..., TIES11). Throughout all instance sets n1 = 300, n2 = 250, n3 = 120,
cP = 420, dL = 360, lmin = 3 and lmax = 5. The probabilities of ties in student and
lecturer preference lists increased from ts = tl = 0.0 to ts = tl = 0.5 in steps of 0.05.
(3) Increasing preference list lengths: 10 sets of 10, 000 instances were generated
(labelled PREF1, ..., PREF10). Similar to the TIES cases, throughout all instance sets
n1 = 300, n2 = 250, n3 = 120, cP = 420 and dL = 360. Additionally, ts = tl = 0.2.
Preference list lengths increased from lmin = lmax = 1 to lmin = lmax = 10 in steps of 1.
(4) Instance size scalability: 5 sets of 10 instances were generated (labelled SCALS1, ...,
SCALS5). All instance sets in this experiment used the same parameter values as the
SIZE experiment, except the number of students n1 increased from 10, 000 to 50, 000 in
steps of 10, 000.
(5) Preference list scalability: Finally, 6 sets of 10 instances were created (labelled
SCALP1, ..., SCALP6). Throughout all instance sets n1 = 500 with the same values
for other parameters as the SIZE experiment. However in this case ties were fixed at
ts = tl = 0.4, and lmin = lmax increasing from 25 to 150 in steps of 25.
For each generated instance, we ran the 32 -approximation algorithm and then used the IP
model to find a maximum stable matching. We also computed a minimum stable matching
using a simple adaptation of our IP model for max spa-st, in order to measure the spread
in the sizes of stable matchings. A timeout of 1800 seconds (30 minutes) was imposed on all
instance runs. All experiments were conducted using a machine with 32 cores, 8×64GB RAM
and Dual Intel® Xeon® CPU E5-2697A v4 processors. The operating system was Ubuntu
version 17.04 with all code compiled in Java version 1.8, where the IP models were solved
using Gurobi version 7.5.2. Each approximation algorithm instance was run on a single thread
while each IP instance was run on two threads. No attempt was made to parallelise Java
garbage collection. Repositories for the code and data can be found at https://doi.org/
10.5281/zenodo.1183221 and https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1186823 respectively.
Correctness testing was conducted over all generated instances. This consisted of (1)
ensuring that each matching produced by the approximation algorithm was at least 23 the
size of maximum stable matching, as found by the IP, and, (2) testing that a given allocation
was stable and adhered to all project and lecturer capacities. This was run over all output
from both the approximation algorithm and the IP-based algorithm.
5.2 Experimental results
Experimental results can be seen in Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4. Tables 1, 2 and 3 show the
results from Experiments 1, 2 and 3 respectively (in which the instance size, probability of
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ties and preference list lengths were increased, respectively). From this point onwards an
optimal matching refers to a maximum stable matching. In these tables, column ‘minimum
A/Max’ gives the minimum ratio of approximation algorithm matching size to optimal
matching size that occurred, ‘% A=Max’ displays the percentage of times the approximation
algorithm achieved an optimal result, and ‘% A≥ 0.98Max’ shows the percentage of times
the approximation algorithm achieved a result at least 98% of optimal. The ‘average size’
columns are somewhat self explanatory, with sub-columns ‘A/Max’ and ‘Min/Max’ showing
the average approximation algorithm matching size and minimum stable matching size as a
fraction of optimal. Finally, ‘average total time’ indicates the time taken for model creation,
solving and outputting results per instance. The main findings are summarised below.
The approximation algorithm consistently far exceeds its 32 bound. Considering the column
labelled ‘minimum A/Max’ in Tables 1, 2 and 3, we see that the smallest value was within
the SIZE1 instance set with a ratio of 0.9286. This is well above the required bound of 23 .
On average the approximation algorithm provides results that are closer in size to the
average maximum stable matching than the minimum stable matching. The columns
‘A/Max’ and ‘Min/Max’ show that, on average, for each instance set, the approximation
algorithm produces a solution that is within 98% of maximum and far closer to the
maximum size than to the minimum size.
Table 4 shows the scalability results for increasing instance sizes (Experiment 4) and
increasing preference list lengths (Experiment 5). The ‘instances completed’ column indicates
the number of instances completed before timeout occurred. In addition to showing the
average total time taken (where ‘total’ includes model creation time and solution time), the
column ‘average solve time’ displays the time taken to either execute the approximation
algorithm, or solve the IP model (in both cases, model creation time is excluded).
For Experiment 4, the number of instances solved within the 30-minute timeout reduced
from 10 to 0 for the IP-based algorithm finding the maximum stable matching. However,
even for the largest instance set sizes the approximation algorithm was able to solve all
instances on average within a total of 21 seconds (0.8 seconds of which was used to actually
execute the algorithm).
For Experiment 5, with a higher probability of ties and increasing preference list lengths,
the IP-based algorithm was only able to solve all the instances of one instance set (SCALP2)
within 30 minutes each, however the approximation algorithm took less than 0.3 seconds on
average to return a solution for each instance. This shows that the approximation algorithm
is useful for either larger or more complex instances than the IP-based algorithm can handle,
motivating its use for real world scenarios.
6 Future work
This paper has described a 32 -approximation algorithm for max spa-st. It remains open to
describe an approximation algorithm that has a better performance guarantee, and/or to
prove a stronger lower bound on the inapproximability of the problem than the current best
bound of 3329 [12]. Further experiments could also measure the extent to which the order that
students apply to projects in Algorithm 1 affects the size of the stable matching generated.
The work in this paper has mainly focused on the size of stable matchings. However, it is
possible for a stable matching to admit a blocking coalition, where a permutation of student
assignments could improve the allocations of the students and lecturers involved without
harming anyone else. Since permutations of this kind cannot change the size of the matching
they are not studied further here, but would be of interest for future work.
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minimum
A/Max
%
A=Max
% A≥
0.98Max
average size average total time (ms)
Case A Min Max A/Max Min/Max A Min Max
SIZE1 0.9286 17.8 62.7 96.4 92.0 97.8 0.986 0.941 43.3 147.6 137.8
SIZE2 0.9585 1.6 62.6 192.6 183.4 195.7 0.984 0.937 51.2 230.6 210.6
SIZE3 0.9556 0.1 63.7 288.7 274.9 293.7 0.983 0.936 56.6 346.4 313.4
SIZE4 0.9644 0.0 65.6 384.9 366.4 391.7 0.983 0.935 59.7 488.7 429.3
SIZE5 0.9654 0.0 66.5 481.0 457.7 489.6 0.982 0.935 62.8 660.3 555.6
SIZE6 0.9641 0.0 66.8 577.2 549.3 587.7 0.982 0.935 66.4 862.3 713.0
SIZE7 0.9679 0.0 65.4 673.3 640.5 685.7 0.982 0.934 69.8 1127.8 900.6
SIZE8 0.9684 0.0 67.4 769.5 732.0 783.8 0.982 0.934 73.0 1437.3 1098.2
SIZE9 0.9653 0.0 68.6 865.6 823.4 881.7 0.982 0.934 76.5 1784.3 1343.9
SIZE10 0.9701 0.0 68.0 961.7 914.7 979.7 0.982 0.934 86.6 2281.2 1651.0
Table 1 Increasing instance size experimental results.
minimum
A/Max
%
A=Max
% A≥
0.98Max
average size average total time (ms)
Case A Min Max A/Max Min/Max A Min Max
TIES1 1.0000 100.0 100.0 284.0 284.0 284.0 1.000 1.000 59.2 184.0 186.9
TIES2 0.9792 38.0 100.0 284.9 282.0 285.8 0.997 0.987 61.2 192.4 194.7
TIES3 0.9722 12.1 99.3 285.9 279.9 287.9 0.993 0.972 61.7 201.0 203.1
TIES4 0.9655 3.4 95.2 287.0 277.6 289.9 0.990 0.958 62.3 213.3 214.5
TIES5 0.9626 1.0 82.5 288.0 275.1 291.9 0.986 0.942 62.9 234.3 231.0
TIES6 0.9558 0.4 66.7 289.2 272.4 294.0 0.984 0.927 64.2 274.2 260.6
TIES7 0.9486 0.2 52.9 290.3 269.4 295.7 0.982 0.911 64.3 358.3 311.3
TIES8 0.9527 0.2 46.4 291.4 266.2 297.2 0.980 0.896 64.2 577.3 380.7
TIES9 0.9467 0.2 50.4 292.5 262.7 298.3 0.980 0.880 65.2 1234.1 427.5
TIES10 0.9529 0.5 61.9 293.7 258.9 299.1 0.982 0.866 59.6 2903.4 409.1
TIES11 0.9467 1.0 74.2 294.8 254.8 299.5 0.984 0.851 60.4 5756.9 377.4
Table 2 Increasing probability of ties experimental results.
S
E
A
2018
8:12
A
32 -approxim
ation
algorithm
for
the
Student-Project
A
llocation
problem
minimum
A/Max
%
A=Max
% A≥
0.98Max
average size average total time (ms)
Case A Min Max A/Max Min/Max A Min Max
PREF1 1.0000 100.0 100.0 215.0 215.0 215.0 1.000 1.000 74.3 107.5 105.1
PREF2 0.9699 12.3 99.0 262.1 249.1 264.1 0.993 0.943 67.5 133.8 128.7
PREF3 0.9617 1.2 84.0 280.9 266.4 284.7 0.987 0.936 68.1 181.4 174.0
PREF4 0.9623 1.0 82.8 290.0 277.0 293.9 0.987 0.943 69.1 249.7 242.6
PREF5 0.9661 4.2 95.1 294.8 283.9 297.7 0.990 0.954 68.3 346.7 340.3
PREF6 0.9732 15.7 99.5 297.3 288.7 299.1 0.994 0.965 66.1 472.4 440.6
PREF7 0.9767 36.2 100.0 298.7 292.1 299.7 0.997 0.975 64.5 638.3 550.9
PREF8 0.9833 58.2 100.0 299.3 294.4 299.9 0.998 0.982 64.1 811.9 660.3
PREF9 0.9866 75.5 100.0 299.7 296.1 299.9 0.999 0.987 63.4 1032.2 789.1
PREF10 0.9900 87.3 100.0 299.8 297.4 300.0 1.000 0.991 104.3 1239.4 931.0
Table 3 Increasing preference list length experimental results.
instances completed average solve time (ms) average total time (ms)
Case A Min Max A Min Max A Min Max
SCALS1 10 10 10 136.5 126162.8 225917.9 1393.8 127980.3 227764.3
SCALS2 10 10 9 242.4 348849.4 1091424.2 5356.7 353272.3 1096045.6
SCALS3 10 10 0 491.7 777267.7 N/A 13095.3 785421.2 N/A
SCALS4 10 7 0 718.8 1049122.0 N/A 18883.5 1062076.4 N/A
SCALS5 10 7 0 803.5 1288961.1 N/A 20993.0 1307728.7 N/A
SCALP1 10 0 9 25.1 N/A 93086.0 193.3 N/A 94242.9
SCALP2 10 1 10 23.3 1425177.0 626774.9 189.4 1428844.0 631225.2
SCALP3 10 0 3 31.7 N/A 867107.7 196.6 N/A 882251.0
SCALP4 10 0 1 37.8 N/A 1551376.0 248.5 N/A 1594201.0
SCALP5 10 0 0 59.0 N/A N/A 283.7 N/A N/A
SCALP6 10 0 0 45.7 N/A N/A 288.4 N/A N/A
Table 4 Scalability experimental results.
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Appendix
A Cloning from SPA-ST to HRT
Manlove [8, Theorem 3.11] describes a polynomial transformation from a weakly stable
matching in and instance of hrt to a weakly stable matching in an instance of smti, and
vice versa, where the size of matchings is conserved.
A natural cloning method to convert instances of SPA-ST to instances of HRT is given
as Algorithm 4. This algorithm involves converting students into residents and projects into
hospitals. Hospitals inherit their capacity from projects. Residents inherit their preference
lists naturally from students. Hospitals inherit their preference lists from the lecturer who
offers their associated project; a resident entry ri is ranked only if ri also ranks this hospital.
In order to translate lecturer capacities into the HRT instance, a number of dummy residents
are created for each lecturer. The number created for lecturer lk is equal to the sum of
capacities of their offered projects Pk minus the capacity of lk. We will ensure that all dummy
residents are assigned in any stable matching. To this end, each dummy resident has a first
position tie of all hospitals associated with projects of lk, and each hospital hj in this set
has a first position tie of all dummy residents associated with lk. In this way, as all dummy
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residents must be assigned in any stable matching by Proposition 4 lecturer capacities are
automatically adhered to.
I Proposition 4. Let I ′ be an instance of hrt created from an instance I of spa-st using
Algorithm 4. All dummy residents must be assigned in any stable matching in I ′.
Proof. In I ′, for each lecturer lk, the number of dummy residents created is equal to
fk =
∑
pj∈Pk cj − dk. Assume for contradiction that one of the dummy residents rkd1 is
unassigned in some stable matching M ′ of I ′.
Let Hk denote the set of hospitals associated with projects of lk. Since rkd1 is a dummy
resident, it must have all hospitals in Hk tied in first position. Also, each hospital in Hk
must rank all fk dummy students (associated with lk) in tied first position. Since rkd1 is
unassigned in M ′, rkd1 would prefer to be assigned to any hospital in Hk. Also, since there is
at least one dummy resident unassigned, there must be at least one hospital hkd2 in Hk that
has fewer first-choice assignees than its capacity. Hospital hkd2 must exist since if it did not,
then all dummy residents would be matched. But then (rkd1 , hd2) would be a blocking pair of
M ′, a contradiction. J
Algorithm 4 Clone-spa-st, Converts an spa-st instance into an HRT instance
Require: An instance I of spa-st
Ensure: Return an instance I ′ of hrt
1: for all student si in S do
2: create a resident ri
3: ri inherits their preference list from si’s list, ranking hospitals rather than projects
4: end for
5: for all project pj in P do
6: create a hospital hj
7: hj ’s capacity is given by ej = cj
8: let lk be the lecturer offering project pj
9: hj inherits their preference list from lk’s list, where a resident entry ri is retained
only if ri also ranks hj
10: end for
11: for all lecturer lk in L do
12: if dk <
∑
pj∈Pk cj then
13: let fk =
∑
pj∈Pk cj − dk
14: create fk new dummy residents rk = {rk1 , rk2 , . . . , rkf}
15: let Hk denote the set of all hospitals in I ′ associated with the projects of Pk in I
16: the preference list of each dummy resident is given by a first position tie of all
hospitals in Hk
17: a first position tie of all residents in rk is added to the start of the preference list
of each hospital in Hk
18: end if
19: end for
20: Let hrt instance I ′ be formed from all residents (including dummy residents) and
hospitals
21: return instance I ′
I Theorem 5. Given an instance I of spa-st we can construct an instance I ′ of hrt in
O(n1 +Dn2 +m) time with the property that a stable matching M in I can be converted to a
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stable matching M ′ in hrt in O(Dn2+m) time, where |M ′| = |M |+
∑
lk∈Q
∑
pr∈Pk(cr)−dk.
Here, n1 denotes the number of students, n2 the number of projects, D the total capacities of
lecturers and m the total length of student preference lists.
Proof. Suppose M is a stable matching in I. We construct an instance I ′ of hrt using
Algorithm 4. The time complexity of O(n1 +Dn2 +m) for the reduction carried out by the
algorithm is achieved by noting that I ′ has a maximum of n1+n2+D agents and that there
are a maximum of Dn2 +m acceptable resident-hospital pairs.
Initially let M ′ =M . Let the set of dummy residents Rd in I ′ form a resident-complete
matching (when considering the residents in Rd) with the set of all hospitals and add these
pairs to M ′. This is possible (as proved in Proposition 4) because for each lecturer lk each
dummy resident associated with lk denoted Rkd finds all projects in Pk acceptable, and
moreover the total number of remaining positions of the projects is at least as large as∑
pr∈Pk(cr)− |M(lk)| = δk and |Rk| = δk by definition.
We claim that M ′ is stable in I ′. Suppose for contradiction that (ri, hj) blocks M ′ in I ′.
All dummy residents must be assigned in M ′ to their first-choice hospital by above, hence
ri corresponds to a student si in I. Resident ri inherited their preference list from si
hence we know that si finds pj acceptable. Therefore by the definition given in Section 2,
condition (1) of a blocking pair of M in I is satisfied.
Resident ri is either unassigned in M ′ or prefers hj to M ′(ri). Student si is therefore in
an equivalent position and condition (2) of a blocking pair of M in I is satisfied.
Hospital hj is either undersubscribed or prefers ri to their worst assignee in M ′.
If hj is undersubscribed, then pj must also be undersubscribed. If lk were full in M ,
then hj would be full in M ′ since
∑
pr∈Pk(cr) = δk+ |M(lk)| in this scenario, therefore
lk must be undersubscribed. But if lk is undersubscribed then this satisfies condition
(3a) of a blocking pair.
If hj prefers ri to their worst assignee in M ′, then lk must prefer si to their worst
assignee in M(pj). This satisfies condition 3(c) of a blocking pair.
Therefore by the definition in Section 2, (si, pj) is a blocking pair ofM in I, a contradiction.
Since dummy residents are added in the algorithm’s execution it is clear that in general
|M | 6= |M ′|. However, since all dummy residents must be assigned by Proposition 4, it is
trivial to calculate the difference
|M ′| = |M |+ |Rd| = |M |+
∑
lk∈Q
∑
pr∈Pk
(cr)− dk.
J
The converse of Theorem 5 is not true in general, as shown in the example in Figure 2.
Here a stable matching M ′ in an instance I ′ of hrt does not convert into a stable matching
M of the associated instance I of spa-st.
A natural question arises as to whether in special circumstances we can use the cloning
process described in Algorithm 4: that is, convert to hrt then to smti, then use Király’s
3/2-approximation algorithm on the smti instance, and obtain as a result a matching that is
a 3/2-approximation to a maximum stable matching in the original instance of spa-st. For
example, assuming that the matching M resulting from the above process is stable, can we
ensure the 3/2 bound?
The following example demonstrates Algorithm 4 in use and shows that the process
described above is not sufficient to retain the 3/2-approximation in an spa-st instance even
if M is stable.
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Resident preferences:
r1: h1 h2
r2: h2 h3
r3: (h1 h2)
Hospital preferences:
h1: r3 r1
h2: r3 r2 r1
h3: r2
e1 = 1
e2 = 1
e3 = 1
(a) hrt instance I ′ conver-
ted from the spa-st instance
in Figure 2b Stable matching
M ′ = {(r1, h1), (r2, h3), (r3, h2)}
shown in bold.
Student preferences:
s1: p1 p2
s2: p2 p3
Project details:
p1: lecturer l1, c1 = 1
p2: lecturer l1, c2 = 1
p3: lecturer l2, c3 = 1
Lecturer preferences:
l1: s2 s1
l2: s2
d1 = 1
d2 = 1
(b) Example SPA-ST instance I. Un-
stable matching M = {(s1, p1), (s2, p3)}
derived from M ′ shown in bold.
Figure 2 Conversion of a stable matching M ′ in hrt into matching M in spa-st.
Algorithm 4 is used to convert the spa-st instance I in Figure 3a to an instance I ′ of HRT
in Figure 3b which is then itself converted to the instance I ′′ of SMTI in Figure 3c using the
process described by Manlove [8, Theorem 3.11]. In this process men correspond to hospitals
in I ′ (projects in I) and women correspond to residents in I ′ (students in I). Executing
Király’s [6] 3/2-approximation algorithm on the smti instance I ′′ could (depending on order
of proposals) yield the matching
M ′′ = {(w2,m4), (w4,m3), (w5,m2), (w6,m6), (w7,m7)}
in I ′′. A trace of how this matching is created is given in Table 5. As w5, w6 and w7 were
created from dummy residents in Algorithm 4, M ′′ (stable in I ′′) converts into the matching
Mc = {(s2, p4), (s4, p3)} of size 2 in I. But a maximum stable matching in I is of size 4, given
by M = {(s1, p3), (s2, p1), (s3, p3), (s4, p2)}. Therefore using the cloning method described
above and Király’s algorithm does not result in a 3/2-approximation to the maximum stable
matching for instances of spa-st. This motivates the development of a 3/2-approximation
algorithm to the maximum stable matching specifically for instances of spa-st.
An intuitive idea as to how the addition of dummy residents in the conversion of this
spa-st instance to an smti instance stops the retention of the 3/2 bound follows. Figure 4a
shows the spa-st instance I2 which is the same as the instance in Figure 3a but with project
1 and 2 capacities reduced to 1. Figure 4c shows I2 converted into an smti instance I ′′2 using
the same two-stage process as in Figure 3. Finally, Table 6 shows the algorithm trace for
instance I ′′2 using Király’s 3/2 smti algorithm.
The main first difference in the traces can be seen on line 14 of Table 5 and line 11 of
Table 6. On line 11 of Table 6, m2 applies to w4 as an advantaged man, giving them the
ability to take w4 from m3. This shows the benefit of having a tie including m2 and m3 at
the beginning of w4’s list - either of these men being matched to w4 would be equally useful
in a stable matching. Therefore allowing m2 to take w4 from m3 gives m3 a chance to get
another partner, increasing the size of matching eventually attained. On line 14 of Table 5,
m2 becomes ‘stuck’ on w5, one of the women derived from a dummy resident. This stops m2
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Action m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7
1 m7 applies w7, accepted w7
2 m6 applies w5, accepted w5 w7
3 m5 applies w6, accepted w6 w5 w7
4 m4 applies w7, rejected, w7 pref removed by m4 w6 w5 w7
5 m4 applies w4, accepted w4 w6 w5 w7
6 m3 applies w7, rejected, w7 pref removed by m3 w4 w6 w5 w7
7 m3 applies w4, accepted, w4 pref removed by m4 w4 w6 w5 w7
8 m4 applies w2, accepted w4 w2 w6 w5 w7
9 m2 applies w5, rejected, w5 pref removed by m2 w4 w2 w6 w5 w7
10 m2 applies w6, rejected, w6 pref removed by m2 w4 w2 w6 w5 w7
11 m2 applies w2, rejected, w2 pref removed by m2 w4 w2 w6 w5 w7
12 m2 applies w4, rejected, w4 pref removed by m2 w4 w2 w6 w5 w7
13 m2 advantaged w4 w2 w6 w5 w7
14 m2 applies w5, accepted, w5 removed by m6 w5 w4 w2 w6 w7
15 m6 applies w6, rejected, w6 removed by m6 w5 w4 w2 w6 w7
16 m6 applies w2, rejected, w2 removed by m6 w5 w4 w2 w6 w7
17 m6 applies w4, rejected, w4 removed by m6 w5 w4 w2 w6 w7
18 m6 advantaged w5 w4 w2 w6 w7
19 m6 applies w5, rejected, w5 pref removed by m6 w5 w4 w2 w6 w7
20 m6 applies w6, accepted, w6 pref removed by m5 w5 w4 w2 w6 w7
21 m5 applies w5, rejected, w5 pref removed by m5 w5 w4 w2 w6 w7
22 m5 applies w2, rejected, w2 pref removed by m5 w5 w4 w2 w6 w7
23 m5 applies w4, rejected, w4 pref removed by m5 w5 w4 w2 w6 w7
24 m5 advantaged w5 w4 w2 w6 w7
25 m5 applies w5, rejected, w5 pref removed by m5 w5 w4 w2 w6 w7
26 m5 applies w6, rejected, w6 pref removed by m5 w5 w4 w2 w6 w7
27 m5 applies w2, rejected, w2 pref removed by m5 w5 w4 w2 w6 w7
28 m5 applies w4, rejected, w4 pref removed by m5 w5 w4 w2 w6 w7
29 m5 inactive w5 w4 w2 − w6 w7
30 m1 applies w5, rejected, w5 removed by m1 w5 w4 w2 − w6 w7
31 m1 applies w6, rejected, w6 removed by m1 w5 w4 w2 − w6 w7
32 m1 applies w2, rejected, w2 removed by m1 w5 w4 w2 − w6 w7
33 m1 applies w4, rejected, w4 removed by m1 w5 w4 w2 − w6 w7
34 m1 advantaged w5 w4 w2 − w6 w7
35 m1 applies w5, rejected, w5 removed by m1 w5 w4 w2 − w6 w7
36 m1 applies w6, rejected, w6 removed by m1 w5 w4 w2 − w6 w7
37 m1 applies w2, rejected, w2 removed by m1 w5 w4 w2 − w6 w7
38 m1 applies w4, rejected, w4 removed by m1 w5 w4 w2 − w6 w7
39 m1 inactive − w5 w4 w2 − w6 w7
Table 5 Trace of running Király’s HRT 3/2-approximation algorithm to the maximum stable
matching for instance I ′′ in Figure 3c.
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Student preferences:
s1: p3
s2: p4 p1 p2
s3: p3
s4: (p2 p3) p4 p1
Project details:
p1: lecturer l1, c1 = 2
p2: lecturer l1, c2 = 2
p3: lecturer l2, c3 = 2
p4: lecturer l2, c4 = 1
Lecturer preferences:
l1: s2 s4
l2: s4 (s1 s2 s3)
d1 = 2
d2 = 2
(a) Example SPA-ST in-
stance I.
Resident preferences:
r1: h3
r2: h4 h1 h2
r3: h3
r4: (h2 h3) h4 h1
r5: (h1 h2)
r6: (h1 h2)
r7: (h3 h4)
Hospital preferences:
h1: (r5 r6) r2 r4
h2: (r5 r6) r2 r4
h3: r7 r4 (r1 r3)
h4: r7 r4 r2
e1 = 2
e2 = 2
e3 = 2
e4 = 1
(b) hrt instance I ′ converted
from the spa-st instance in
Figure 3a.
Women’s preferences:
w1: (m3 m7)
w2: m4 (m1 m5) (m2 m6)
w3: (m3 m7)
w4: (m2 m6 m3 m7) m4 (m1 m5)
w5: (m1 m5 m2 m6)
w6: (m1 m5 m2 m6)
w7: (m3 m4 m7)
Men’s preferences:
m1: (w5 w6) w2 w4
m2: (w5 w6) w2 w4
m3: w7 w4 (w1 w3)
m4: w7 w4 w2
m5: (w5 w6) w2 w4
m6: (w5 w6) w2 w4
m7: w7 w4 (w1 w3)
(c) smti instance I ′′ converted from
the hrt instance in Figure 3b.
Figure 3 Conversion of an spa-st instance to an smti instance.
being able to ever apply to w4 as an advantaged man and the benefits of having m2 and m3
tied at the beginning of w4’s preference list are not realised.
B 32-approximation algorithm correctness proofs
B.1 Preliminary proofs
I Proposition 6. Let T0 denote the point in Algorithm 1’s execution at the end of the main
while loop. If a project pj is not fully available at some point before T0, then it cannot
subsequently become fully available before T0.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that project pj is not fully available at some point before
T0, but then subsequently becomes fully available before T0. At a point where pj is not fully
available, either pj is full or lk is full (or both), where lk offers pj . If lk is full, it is clear
that lk must remain so, since students can only be removed from a project of lk’s if they
are immediately replaced by another student assigning to a project of lk. Therefore assume
that pj is full. Then they must somehow become undersubscribed in order to be classified as
fully available. The only way this can happen before T0 is if lecturer lk removes a student
assigned to pj in order to replace them with a student becoming assigned to another project
of lk’s. But then this deletion can only occur if lk is full and as above lk remains full, so pj
cannot become fully available before T0, a contradiction. J
I Proposition 7. Suppose a blocking pair (si, pj′) of type (3bi) exists at the end of the main
while loop of Algorithm 1, where lk offers pj′ , and denote this time by T0. Then at time T0,
lk is full.
F. Cooper and D. Manlove 8:19
Students preferences:
s1: p3
s2: p4 p1 p2
s3: p3
s4: (p2 p3) p4 p1
Project details:
p1: lecturer l1, c1 = 1
p2: lecturer l1, c2 = 1
p3: lecturer l2, c3 = 2
p4: lecturer l2, c4 = 1
Lecturer preferences:
l1: s2 s4
l2: s4 (s1 s2 s3)
d1 = 2
d2 = 2
(a) Example SPA-ST instance
I2. Same as instance I in Fig-
ure 3a except that projects 1
and 2 have an capacity of 1.
Resident preferences:
r1: h3
r2: h4 h1 h2
r3: h3
r4: (h2 h3) h4 h1
r5: (h3 h4)
Hospital preferences:
h1: r2 r4
h2: r2 r4
h3: r5 r4 (r1 r3)
h4: r5 r4 r2
e1 = 1
e2 = 1
e3 = 2
e4 = 1
(b) hrt instance I ′2 converted
from the spa-st instance in
Figure 4a.
Women’s preferences:
w1: (m3 m5)
w2: m4 m1 m2
w3: (m3 m5)
w4: (m2 m3 m5) m4 m1
w5: (m3 m5 m4)
Men’s preferences:
m1: w2 w4
m2: w2 w4
m3: w5 w4 (w1 w3)
m4: w5 w4 w2
m5: w5 w4 (w1 w3)
(c) smti instance I ′′2 conver-
ted from the hrt instance in
Figure 4b.
Figure 4 Conversion of an spa-st instance to an smti instance.
Action m1 m2 m3 m4 m5
1 m5 applies w5, accepted w5
2 m4 applies w5, rejected, w5 pref removed by m4 w5
3 m4 applies w4, accepted w4 w5
4 m3 applies w5, rejected, w5 pref removed by m3 w4 w5
5 m3 applies w4, accepted, w4 pref removed by m4 w4 w5
6 m4 applies w2, accepted w4 w2 w5
7 m2 applies w2, rejected, w2 pref removed by m2 w4 w2 w5
8 m2 applies w4, rejected, w4 pref removed by m2 w4 w2 w5
9 m2 advantaged w4 w2 w5
10 m2 applies w2, rejected, w2 pref removed by m2 w4 w2 w5
11 m2 applies w4, accepted, w4 pref removed by m3 w4 w2 w5
12 m3 applies w1, accepted w4 w1 w2 w5
13 m1 applies w2, rejected, w2 pref removed by m1 w4 w1 w2 w5
14 m1 applies w4, rejected, w4 pref removed by m1 w4 w1 w2 w5
15 m1 advantaged w4 w1 w2 w5
16 m1 applies w2, rejected, w2 pref removed by m1 w4 w1 w2 w5
17 m1 applies w4, rejected, w4 pref removed by m1 w4 w1 w2 w5
18 m1 inactive − w4 w1 w2 w5
Table 6 Trace of running Király’s smti 3/2-approximation algorithm to the maximum stable
matching for instance I ′′2 in Figure 3c.
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Proof. Assume for contradiction that lk is undersubscribed at T0. We know that once a
lecturer is full they must remain full (since we can only remove a pair associated with a
lecturer if we are immediately replacing it with an associated pair). Therefore lk must
have always been undersubscribed. At T0, pj′ must be undersubscribed for (si, pj′) to be
a blocking pair of type (3bi). Therefore at T0, pj′ is fully available and must always have
previously been fully available by Proposition 6. But si must have applied to pj′ at least once
before T0 and as pj′ was fully available this must have been accepted. Then since (si, pj′)
is not in the matching at T0 it must have been removed before T0. But in order for this
to happen either pj′ or lk would have to be full, contradicting the fact that pj′ was fully
available before T0. Hence lk must be full at T0. J
The following proposition extends Proposition 6.
I Proposition 8. During the execution of Algorithm 1, if a project pj is not fully available
at some point, then it cannot subsequently become fully available.
Proof. Let T0 denote the point in the algorithm’s execution at the end of the main while
loop. We know from Proposition 6 that if a project is not fully available before T0 then it
cannot subsequently become fully available before T0.
Let lecturer lk offer project pj and assume project pj is not fully available at T0. If lk
contains no blocking pairs of type (3bi) then there can be no changes to allocations of pj
after T0. Therefore assume lk contains at least one blocking pair. Then by Proposition 7, lk
is full at T0. But Algorithm 3 does not change the student allocations for any lecturer and
hence lk remains full and pj cannot subsequently become fully available.
It remains to show that if pj is fully available at T0, that it cannot subsequently cease to be
fully available and then return to be fully available before the end of the algorithms execution.
Since lk is undersubscribed at T0, lk cannot contain any blocking pairs by Proposition 7.
Since Algorithm 3 can only affect allocations of projects offered by a full lecturer it is not
possible for pj to change to being not fully available after T0. J
I Proposition 9. No student promotion carried out in Algorithm 3 can be to a fully available
project or create a precarious pair.
Proof. Suppose in Algorithm 3, si is being promoted from project pj to project pj′ both
offered by lecturer lk. We know that in the main while loop si must have iterated over their
preference list at least to the position of pj (and perhaps further if si has been previously
promoted). Therefore, si has either been removed from and / or rejected by all projects at
the same rank as pj′ in their preference list at least once. This can only occur if each of
those projects was not fully available at the time and by Proposition 8 none of these projects
could subsequently be fully available. Therefore when si is promoted to pj′ , it can never
form a precarious pair. J
I Proposition 10. Let lecturer lk offers project pj. If lk is full and not precarious at some
point, then they cannot subsequently become precarious. Similarly, if a project pj is full and
not precarious at some point, then it cannot subsequently become precarious. Further if lk is
full and pj is not precarious then pj cannot subsequently become precarious.
Proof. We know that a precarious pair cannot be created in Algorithm 3 by Proposition 9,
therefore we focus on the main while loop of Algorithm 1. Let lecturer lk be full and not
precarious at some point during the main while loop Algorithm 1’s execution and assume
that they later becomes precarious. Since lk is currently not precarious, the only way they
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can become so is by a student si forming a precarious assignment to a project of lk’s. But
recall that a student will first apply to fully available projects at the head of their preference
list. Since lk is full, no project of lk’s can be considered fully available. In order for si to
apply to a project of lk’s they must first apply to all fully available projects at the head of
their list, gain the assignment and then be removed from M . But if a pair (si, pj) is removed
from M , pj cannot be fully available. Ultimately, si will have exhausted all previously fully
available projects at the head of their list before eventually applying to a project of lk’s. But
then at that point si cannot be precarious giving a contradiction.
Now, let pj be full and not precarious at some point during the main while loop of
Algorithm 1’s execution and assume that it later becomes precarious. If pj remains full until
the time at which it becomes precarious then using similar reasoning to above, any student
assigning to pj cannot be precarious giving a contradiction. If pj becomes undersubscribed
at any point then lk must be full for the remainder of the algorithm by Proposition 8. It is
possible at this point that lk is precarious (with precarious pairs that include projects other
than pj) but since lk is full, pj is not fully available. Therefore using similar reasoning to
before, any student assigning to pj cannot be precarious giving a contradiction.
It also follows then that if lk is full and pj is not precarious then pj cannot subsequently
become precarious. J
I Proposition 11. Suppose a blocking pair (si, pj′) of type (3bi) exists at the end of the main
while loop of Algorithm 1, where lk offers pj′ , and denote this time by T0. Then at time T0,
lk is non-precarious.
Proof. Let M0 be the matching being built at T0 and let (si, pj) ∈M0 with lk offering pj .
Suppose for contradiction that lk is precarious at T0.
As (si, pj′) is a blocking pair of type (3bi), pj′ must be undersubscribed at T0. Also,
since (si, pj′) is a blocking pair we know that si prefers pj′ to pj . Therefore si must have
removed pj′ from their preference list. Denote this time as T1. The removal at T1 occurred
either because (si, pj′) was removed as a non-precarious pair, or because si was rejected on
application to pj′ .
If (si, pj′) was removed as a non-precarious pair at T1 then either lk was full, non-
precarious and si was a worst student assigned to lk, or pj′ was full, non-precarious and
si was a worst student assigned to pj′ .
If on the other hand, si was rejected on application to pj′ at T1, we know that either lk
was full, non-precarious and lk did not meta-prefer si to a worst student in M(lk), or pj′
was full, non-precarious and lk did not meta-prefer si to a worst student in M(pj).
Whichever of these possibilities occurred we know that at T1, either lk was full and
non-precarious or pj was full and non-precarious.
Firstly suppose lk was full and non-precarious at T1. In this case by Proposition 10 lk
cannot subsequently become precarious, a contradiction to the fact that lk is precarious
at T0.
Therefore, pj′ must have full and non-precarious at T1. By Proposition 10, pj′ cannot
subsequently become precarious. We also know that pj′ must go from being full to being
undersubscribed since pj′ is undersubscribed at T0. Denote this point in the algorithm’s
execution as T2. At T2, pj′ must be non-precarious by above and so a non-precarious pair
involved with pj′ is removed and replaced with a pair involved with some other project of
lk’s. This could only happen if lk was full and non-precarious and so as before cannot
again become precarious, a contradiction.
SEA 2018
8:22 A 32 -approximation algorithm for the Student-Project Allocation problem
Therefore, lk must be non-precarious at T0. J
I Proposition 12. Algorithm 3 cannot change the fully available or precarious status of any
project or lecturer. Additionally, Algorithm 3 cannot change the precarious status of any
pair.
Proof. By Proposition 9, in Algorithm 3 it is not possible to assign a student to a fully
available project. Therefore we cannot change a fully available project or lecturer to being
not fully available. Also, any promotions that take place will be to remove a blocking pair
of type (3bi), and so by definition the lecturer involved, say lk, will be full and |M(lk)| will
remain the same. Therefore, none of lk’s projects are not fully available at the start of
Algorithm 3 and must remain so.
By Proposition 9, in Algorithm 3 it is not possible to create a precarious pair, meaning
we cannot change a non-precarious project or lecturer to being a precarious project or
lecturer. Finally, by Proposition 11 no changes can be made to any assignments involving a
precarious project or lecturer, hence we cannot change a precarious project or lecturer to
be non-precarious. Also, since Algorithm 3 cannot change the fully available status of any
project, it is not possible for a pair to change it’s precarious status. J
Recall, a worse student than student si, according to lecturer lk, is any student with a
lower rank than si on lk’s preference list, or if si is in phase 2, any student of the same rank
that is in phase 1.
I Proposition 13. Let T0 denote the point in Algorithm 1’s execution at the end of the main
while loop. Then the following statements are true.
1. If a project pj offered by lk is full before T0, then a student si worse than or equal to lk’s
worst ranked assignee(s) in M(pj) cannot subsequently become assigned to pj before T0
unless pj is precarious when si applies to pj.
2. If a lecturer lk is full, then a student si worse than or equal to lk’s worst assignee(s)
cannot become assigned to a project pj offered by lk unless this occurs during the main
while loop and lk is precarious when si applies to pj.
Proof. We deal with each case separately.
1. Assume first that pj is full and not precarious. Before T0, student si can only be added
to the matching if the conditions on Line 17 are held, and lk meta-prefers si to a worst
assignee in M(pj). Therefore lk cannot accept a student that is worse than or equal to a
worst student in M(pj) before T0.
2. It is clear that in Algorithm 3 students assigned to a particular lecturer cannot change,
hence we concentrate only on the main while loop of Algorithm 1. Now assume that lk
is full and not precarious before T0. Also since the case where pj is full has been dealt
with, assume that pj is undersubscribed. Since lk is not precarious, if si were to be added
to the matching, lk must adhere to the conditions on Line 8 and so meta-prefer si to a
worst assignee of lk. Therefore lk cannot accept a student that is worse than or equal to
a worst student in M(lk).
Therefore each case is proved. J
If on the other hand, as an example, lk is full and precarious (or pj is full and precarious)
before T0 it is easy to see that a student worse than the current lowest ranked assignee in
M(lk) (M(pj)) could be added before T0.
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B.2 Stability
I Lemma 14. Let M1 denote the matching constructed immediately after the main while
loop in Algorithm 1 has completed and let T1 denote this point in the algorithm’s execution.
At T1, no blocking pair of type (3a), (3bii) or (3c) can exist relative to M1.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that (sb1 , pb2) is a blocking pair of M1 of type (3a), (3bii)
or (3c). Let lb3 be the lecturer who offers pb2 .
It must be the case that in M1, sb1 is either assigned to a project of lower rank than pb2
or is assigned to no project. Therefore, sb1 must have removed pb2 from their preference
list during the main while loop of Algorithm 1. Let M0 denote the matching constructed
immediately before pb2 was first removed from sb1 ’s list and let T0 denote this point in
the algorithm’s execution. We know that pb2 cannot be fully available at T0 (otherwise
(sb1 , pb2) would have been added to M0) and cannot subsequently become fully available by
Proposition 8. There are three places where pb2 could be removed from sb1 ’s list, namely
Lines 13, 22 and 27. We look at each type of blocking pair in turn.
(3a) - Assume we have a blocking pair of type (3a) in M1. Then, pb2 and lb3 are both
undersubscribed (and hence pb2 is fully available) in M1. But this contradicts the above
statement that pb2 cannot be fully available after T0.
(3bii) & (3c) - Assume we have a blocking pair of type (3bii) or (3c) in M1. At T0, pb2 is
not fully available and so either pb2 is undersubscribed with lb3 being full, or pb2 is full.
If pb2 was undersubscribed and lb3 was full at T0 then lb3 cannot have been precarious
(since sb1 is about to remove pb2 from their list) and by Proposition 10, cannot
subsequently become precarious. By Proposition 13, lb3 cannot subsequently accept
a student ranked lower than a worst student in M0(lb3). Also either sb1 is a worst
assignee in M0(lb3) (Line 13), or lb3 ranks sb1 at least as badly as a worst student in
M0(lb3) (Line 27). Lecturer lb3 must remain full for the rest of the algorithm since if a
student is removed from a project offered by lb3 then they are immediately replaced.
Therefore lb3 must be full in M1, and since lb3 cannot have accepted a worse ranked
student than sb1 after T0, (sb1 , pb2) cannot be a blocking pair of M1 of type (3bii) or
(3c).
Instead assume at T0 that pb2 is full in M0. As sb1 is about to remove pb2 , we know pb2
cannot be precarious, and by Proposition 10, cannot subsequently become precarious.
Either sb1 is a worst assignee in M0(pb2) (Line 22), or lb3 ranks sb1 at least as badly
as a worst student in M0(pb2) (Line 27).
If pb2 remains full until T1, then clearly (sb1 , pb2) cannot block M1 by Proposition
13. So assume pb2 becomes undersubscribed at some point between T0 and T1 for the
first time, say at T0.5. This can only happen if lb3 is full and there is a student si
who assigns to another project pj that lb3 offers, where si is meta-preferred to a worst
student in M0(lb3). This worst student must also be a worst student in M0(pb2) since
we are removing from M0 a pair associated with pb2 . But then sb1 must be ranked at
least as badly as a worst student in M0(lb3). Using similar reasoning to the previous
case, lb3 must be full in M1, non-precarious, and since lb3 cannot have accepted a
worse ranked student than sb1 after T0.5, (sb1 , pb2) cannot be a blocking pair of M1 of
type (3bii) or (3c).
Hence it is not possible for (sb1 , pb2) to be a blocking pair of M of type (3a), (3bii) or (3c)
after the main while loop. J
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I Proposition 15. Let M1 be the matching constructed immediately at the end of the main
while loop of Algorithm 1’s execution, and let T1 denote this point in the algorithm’s execution.
At T1, for each blocking pair (si, pj′) of type (3bi), si must be one of the worst assignees of
M1(lk), where lk offers pj′ .
Proof. Since (si, pj′) is a blocking pair of type (3bi), we know that si is assigned to another
project, say pj , of lk’s in M1, where si prefers pj′ to pj .
During the main while loop’s execution, student si must have removed pj′ from their
preference list in order to eventually assign to pj . Student si’s removal of pj′ could only
happen if pj′ was not precarious at this point. By Proposition 10, pj′ cannot subsequently
become precarious. Let the matching constructed immediately before this removal be denoted
by M0 and let T0 denote this point in the algorithm’s execution. Project pj′ was either full or
undersubscribed at T0. We show that in both of these cases, si is one of the worst students
in M1(lk).
Suppose pj′ was full at T0. Then as pj′ is not precarious, pj′ cannot subsequently be
assigned a student worse than the worst assignee in M0(pj′) up until T1, by Proposition
13. Since si removed pj′ from their list while pj′ was full we know that either si is a
worst assignee in M0(pj′) (Line 22), or lk ranks si at least as badly as a worst student in
M0(pj′) (Line 27). Between T0 and T1, si assigns to the project pj , at a worse rank than
pj′ in si’s list, where pj is also offered by lk.
Now, we know that pj′ becomes undersubscribed by T1 and so it must be the case that
there is a point T0.5 between T0 and T1, such that another student si′ assigns to a
project (not pj′) of lk’s which removes pair (si′′ , pj′) from the matching constructed just
before that removal, denoted by M0.5. Let T0.5 be the first point at which pj′ becomes
undersubscribed after T0. Lecturer lk must be full at this point since the addition of si′
removes a student (namely si′′) from a different project (namely pj′). Also, lecturer lk
cannot have been precarious, otherwise pj′ would have been identified as a precarious
project at Line 10, but we know pj′ cannot have been precarious after T0. So si′′ must
have been a worst assignee in M0.5(lk) and therefore M0.5(pj′). Since T0.5 is the first
point pj′ becomes undersubscribed after T0, the worst student in M0.5(pj′) can be no
worse than the worst student in M0(pj′) by Proposition 13. Student si must be either a
worst student in M0.5(lk), or be as bad as a worst student in M0.5(lk). By Propositions
10 and 13, lk cannot be assigned a worse student than si between T0.5 to T1, and so as si
is assigned to lk at T1 then they must be one of the worst students in M1(lk).
Suppose then that pj′ is undersubscribed at T0. Since a preference element is being
removed, lk must have been full, non-precarious and either si is a worst assignee in M0(lk)
(Line 13), or lk ranks si at least as badly as a worst student in M0(lk) (Line 27). But
then by Propositions 10 and 13, lk must have remained non-precarious until T1 and been
unable to assign to a worse student than si. Since si is assigned to a project of lk’s, si
must be one of the worst students in M1(lk).
Therefore, for any blocking pair (si, pj′) of type (3bi) of M1, si must be one of the worst
students in M1(lk). J
I Proposition 16. In Algorithm 3, if a blocking pair (si′ , pj) of type (3bi) is created (in the
process of removing a different blocking pair of type (3bi)) then si′ must be one of the worst
students in M2(lk), where lk is the lecturer who offers pj and M2 is the matching constructed
immediately after this removal occurs.
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Proof. Let M0 denote the matching at the end of the main while loop of Algorithm 1, and
let T0 denote this point in the algorithm’s execution. Assume that during Algorithm 3’s
execution, the first promotion to reveal a blocking pair (si′ , pj) of type (3bi) occurs such that
si′ is not a worst student in M1(lk). Let M1 be the matching constructed just before this
promotion occurs. Suppose the promotion involves student si moving from a less preferred
pj to a more preferred project pj′ . It is clear that in the removal of blocking pairs of type
(3bi) there is no change in regards to which students are assigned to projects of lk, therefore
the same students are assigned to each lecturer in M0, M1 and M2. By Proposition 15, si
is and remains one of the worst assignees of lk in M0, M1 and M2. Since si′ is not a worst
assignee in M2(lk), lk must prefer si′ to si. But this would mean (si′ , pj) was a blocking
pair of type (3c) in M0 if pj were full or (3bii) in M0 if pj were undersubscribed, both a
contradiction to Lemma 14. J
I Proposition 17. It is not possible in Algorithm 3’s execution, for a blocking pair of any
type other than (3bi) to be created.
Proof. Let M0 denote the matching constructed immediately after the main while loop
of Algorithm 1 terminates and let T0 denote this point in the algorithm’s execution. By
Lemma 14, only blocking pairs of type (3bi) of M0 may exist at T0 therefore we restrict our
attention to the removal of such pairs. Assume for a contradiction that during Algorithm
3’s execution, the first promotion to reveal a blocking pair of type not equal to (3bi) occurs.
Let M1 (respectively M2) be the matching constructed just before (respectively after) this
promotion occurs with T1 (respectively T2) denoting this point in the algorithm’s execution.
Suppose that this promotion involves student si being promoted from project pj to project
pj′ as pair (si, pj′) is a blocking pair of M1 of type (3bi). Since (si, pj′) is a blocking pair
of M1 of type (3bi) we know that pj and pj′ are both offered by the same lecturer, say lk.
Assume that this promotion has now revealed a blocking pair (si′ , pj) of type (3a), (3bii) or
(3c) in M2. We look at each case in turn.
(3a) - Since in M1, (si, pj′) was a blocking pair of type (3bi) we know that lk is full at T1.
The promotion involves moving si from one project offered by lk to another, therefore at
T2, lk must be full and so pj cannot be involved in a blocking pair of type (3a) in M2, a
contradiction.
(3bii) - Suppose (si′ , pj) is a blocking pair of type (3bii) in M2. Since it is of type (3bii),
lk must prefer si′ to a worst assignee in M2(lk) (and consequently M1(lk) as students do
not change lecturer). If pj was undersubscribed at T1 then (si′ , pj) would have constituted
a blocking pair of type (3bii), a contradiction. Therefore pj must have been full in M1.
We know that (si, pj) ∈M1 and that si is a worst assignee in M1(lk) by Proposition 15
and 16, therefore lk prefers si′ to si. It follows that (si′ , pj) would have constituted a
blocking pair in M1 of type (3c), a contradiction to the fact that no blocking pair of any
type other than (3bi) was revealed prior to T2.
(3c) - Suppose finally that (si′ , pj) is a blocking pair of M2 of type (3c). But blocking
pairs of type (3c) require pj to be full in M2 which it cannot be since (si, pj) has been
removed just before T2, hence pj cannot be involved in a blocking pair of type (3c).
Therefore it is not possible for a blocking pair of type (3a), (3bii) or (3c) to be created during
the first promotion of a student, and hence any promotion. J
I Theorem 18. Any matching produced by Algorithm 1 must be stable.
Proof. Let M0 be the matching constructed immediately after the termination of the main
while loop of Algorithm 1 and let T0 denote this stage of the algorithm. Recall that by
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Lemma 14, only blocking pairs of type (3bi) may exist relative to M0. Also, by Lemma 17,
no blocking pair of any other type can exist relative to the matching constructed after T0.
Algorithm 3 systematically removes blocking pairs of type (3bi) in a series of student
promotions. Each promotion improves the outcome for a student.
Therefore there are no blocking pairs of any type in the finalised matching Ms and so
Ms is stable. J
Since this proof relies only on the fact that pb2 is removed from sb1 ’s list once for (sb1 , pb2)
not to become a blocking pair, we can infer that if we allowed students to only iterate once
through their preference preference list rather than twice, this would still result in a stable
matching.
B.3 Time complexity and termination
I Proposition 19. The maximum number of times a student si can apply to a project pj on
their preference list during the main while loop of Algorithm 1 is three.
Proof. First we note that as soon as si removes pj from their preference list once during
Algorithm 1’s execution, (si, pj) cannot currently be or subsequently become a precarious
pair by Proposition 10.
Focussing on the main while loop, assume for some iteration, that phase 1 student si
applies to project pj on their preference list. Either (si, pj) is added to the matching being
built M , or pj is removed from si’s list. If pj is removed from si’s list then si may still apply
to project pj in phase 2 but as noted above (si, pj) cannot become a precarious pair.
Assume instead that (si, pj) is added to M . If it remains in M until the algorithm
completes then si cannot apply to pj again. So assume that (si, pj) is removed from M at
some point due to another pair being added to M . If (si, pj) was not precarious at the point
it is removed from M then si removes pj from their list and the next time si could apply to
pj is when si is in phase 2 when as above (si, pj) cannot become a precarious pair.
Assume therefore that (si, pj) was precarious when removed from M . Then si does not
remove pj from their list and si can again apply to pj during phase 1. Note that if (si, pj) is
re-added to M it must be as a non-precarious pair. This is because, using similar reasoning
that was used in Proposition 10, at the point at which si reapplies to pj they must have
exhausted all fully available projects at the head of their list, therefore (si, pj) cannot again
become precarious. Therefore, si can apply to pj a maximum of three times during the
execution of the while loop: at most twice while si is in phase 1 (twice only if (si, pj) is
removed as a precarious pair) and at most once in phase 2. J
I Lemma 20. All operations inside the main while loop of Algorithm 1 run in constant time.
Proof. The data structures required are described below and are summarised in Figure 5.
For initialisation purposes, each student, project and lecturer has a list of length n2, n1
and n1 respectively, each entry of which requires O(1) space. In order to not exceed a time
complexity of order the sum of lengths of preference lists, a process of virtual initialisation is
used on these data structures [3, p. 149].
Student data structures. For each student a doubly-linked list of (project, rank) tuples
embedded in an array, prefList, stores their preference list in order of rank, representing
the undeleted entries. A small example is shown in Figure 5 with p3, p2 and p1 all of rank 1
on si’s preference list. Entries may be deleted from this array; a copy of this list prior to
any deletions being carried out is retained in order to allow a second iteration through a
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student’s preference list, if they move into phase 2. An array projPosition of length n2
retains links to the position of (project, rank) tuples in prefList, allowing a constant time
removal of projects from prefList. An integer variable associated with each student stores
which phase this student is in. Examples for these final two data structures are also shown
in Figure 5.
Project data structures. Each project has a link to their supervising lecturer. An
array, projectedPrefList stores the projected preference list of lk for pj in the form of
(student, rank, boolean) tuples. As an example, suppose pj has a projected preference list
starting with s7 at rank 1, s4 at rank 1 and s6 at rank 2 as is shown in Figure 5. The boolean
values indicate which student-project pairs are currently in the matching.
Once a project is full and non-precarious it cannot accept a worse student than it already
has for the remainder of the algorithm, according to Proposition 10. Assume pj is full and non-
precarious. Let the worst student assigned to pj be given by sw. We retain a pointer, last,
which points to the rightmost student at the same rank as sw in pj ’s projectedPrefList.
This pointer must move from right to left in a linear fashion (moving up in ranks) given the
above proposition.
During the course of the algorithm, we may need to remove the worst student according
to lk from M(pj). It is possible that there are two or more students who are worst assignees
with some being in phase 1 and some in phase 2. In order to ensure that we prioritise the
removal of phase 1 students, two pointers are added for each entry in projectedPrefList,
which point to the head of a phase 1 and a phase 2 doubly-linked list associated with that
tie embedded in the projectedPrefList array (this data structure is not shown in Figure
5). Adding or removing a phase 1 or 2 student to either list takes constant time, as they do
not need to be kept in order. Then, un-assigning a student requires a check to be made in
the tie associated with the worst position (found using last), in order to prioritise a phase 1
student’s removal. In total this takes constant time. Note that a student can only change
phase if they are not allocated and therefore updating an allocated student’s phase in these
lists is not necessary unless they have just been added.
Each project also contains a doubly-linked list embedded in an array of students, denoted
by precariousList, containing students who have formed a precarious pair with this project.
In the example in Figure 5, pj is not precarious and so no students form a precarious pair with
pj . Adding to and removing from this list takes constant time if we assume that si is stored
at index i−1. A project pj supports a student si in being precarious if (si, pj′) ∈M and pj is
the first fully available project at the same rank as pj′ in si’s list. Then, a doubly-linked list
embedded in an array of students, supportList, stores the students for which pj gives their
support. As before, adding to and removing from this list takes constant time. A counter
stores the number of students assigned to pj in M .
Lecturer data structures. For each lecturer an array of (student, rank, boolean)
tuples, prefList, stores their preference list in order of rank, with a True value stored in
the ith boolean if student si is assigned to a project of lk’s. Figure 5 shows an example with
s8 not assigned to lk at rank 1 and s2 and s3 both assigned at rank 2. Each lecturer also
has an array of length n1, studentPositions which retains links to the position of (student,
rank, boolean) tuples in lk’s prefList, and a counter stores the number of students assigned
to lk in M . A doubly-linked list embedded in an array of projects, precariousProjList,
stores the projects offered by lk that are precarious, where project pj is stored at index j − 1
in this list if it is precarious. Figure 5 shows p2 being a precarious project of lk.
Similar to projects, by Proposition 10, once a lecturer is full and non-precarious they
cannot accept a worse student than they already have for the remainder of the algorithm.
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Assume lk is full and non-precarious. Using similar data structures described in the Project
Data Structures section above we are able to find lk’s worst assigned student in constant
time.
Student pointers. A student si retains two pointers for the project(s) tied at the head
of their list. One pointer first stores the first fully available project when iterating from left
to right, and second stores the second fully available project. If first (respectively second)
reaches the end of the tie, then a boolean firstFin (respectively secondFin) is set to True.
For each iteration of the main while loop of Algorithm 1, each student si first seeks a project
at the head of their list that is fully available. This will be precisely the project pj that
first points to. Then if second has not reached the end of the tie, (si, pj) is precarious
and the project that second points to, pj′ , supports pj . If however, firstFin is set to True,
then the leftmost project at the head of si’s list is a favourite project, with (si, pj) being
unable to become precarious. Proposition 19 shows that maximum number of applications a
student can make to a project on their preference list is 3. At most twice in phase 1 (twice if
removed as a precarious pair) and once in phase 2.
During phase 2 there are no fully available projects on si’s list since si must have applied
and been rejected (in some way) from every project on their preference list at least once
already. Therefore, the first and second pointers are not required in phase 2. During
phase 1 the the first and second pointers are only required to iterate once over each tie
as described above. Hence, the maximum number of times a student’s list is iterated over
is 4; once each for the two pointers first and second, once again after first and second
have reached the end of the tie at the head of a student’s list (the student may have retained
projects at the head of their list after this point if the projects were precarious), and finally
once during phase 2.
Matching data structures. The current matching is stored in an array of cells
matchArray where cell i− 1 contains project pj if (si, pj) ∈M or null otherwise. Figure 5
shows and example with student s2 being assigned to project p6.
Processes (in the order encountered in Algorithm 1):
1. a student si applies to a favourite project: if si’s FirstFin is set to True then there are
no fully available projects at the head of si’s list, and a favourite project of si will be
the leftmost project. If however, FirstFin is False then there are fully available projects
at the head of their list and a favourite project of si is pointed to by first, which is
retrievable in constant time.
2. deciding if a project pj is undersubscribed or full or deciding if a lecturer lk is undersub-
scribed or full: Using the counters described above a comparison can be made between
pj ’s capacity and their current number of allocations. A similar comparison can be made
for lk. Both can be achieved in constant time.
3. deciding if project pj is fully available: pj would not be fully available if either pj is full
or lk is full. Therefore a comparison of the number of allocations for pj and lk and their
respective capacities is required. Again this can be achieved in constant time.
4. adding a pair (si, pj) to M : Project pj is placed in the i− 1’th cell of matchArray and
pj and lk’s allocation counters are incremented. Project pj ’s projectedPrefList and
lecturer lk’s prefList booleans are updated in constant time using their associated
studentPositions data structures. Each tuple in these lists has a link to the head
of phase 1 and phase 2 lists for their tie. When the pair is added the tuple is added
to either the phase 1 or phase 2 list. If (si, pj) is precarious then si is added to pj ’s
precariousList and the project pointed to by second, pj′ adds si to their supportList.
If pj has just changed from being non-precarious to precarious then lk adds pj to their
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precariousProjList. If the addition of (si, pj) to M means that pj goes from being
fully available to not being fully available then we need to ensure that other students
who rely on pj as their support are updated. Therefore pj alerts each student on their
supportList that they are no longer to be relied upon as a fully available project. This
triggers each of those students to update their second pointers. The time required
for this can be attributed to the movement of second pointers as noted earlier. After
being alerted, some other pair in M may stop being precarious, but any changes can be
conducted in constant time as described above. If on adding pair (si, pj), pj has now
become full and non-precarious then the last pointer will move from right to left over
projectedPrefList until it reaches the end of a tie whose phase 1 and phase 2 lists
are non-empty. From this point on last is only updated upon removing a pair from M
(Point 8).
5. deciding if lk is precarious, and returning a precarious project if one exists: Checking
whether precariousProjList is empty for lk is a simple process that takes constant
time. Retrieving a precarious pair should one exist requires selection of the first student
from lk’s precariousProjList.
6. Finding a worst assignee of lk and deciding if lk meta-prefers si to this worst assignee:
This operation only needs to be executed if lk is full and non-precarious. In that situation
lk’s last pointer will point to the rightmost position in a tie in prefList such that lk’s
current worst student sw is assigned at the same rank. Then as previously discussed, all
that is required is to check the links to phase 1 and phase 2 students for this tie and
return a phase 1 student if one exists, or phase 2 student if not. This can be conducted
in constant time. Deciding if lk meta-prefers si to sw can also be done in constant time
by comparing rank and phase.
7. removing a preference list entry from si’s list: This process is shown in Algorithm 2
which runs in constant time, since we can find a specific project pj in si’s prefList using
the projPosition array.
8. removing a pair (si, pj) from M : The i−1’th cell of matchArray is set to null, and pj and
lk’s allocation counters are decremented. Project pj ’s projectedPrefList and lecturer
lk’s prefList booleans are updated in constant time. The tuples associated with si in
these lists are removed from their phase 1 or phase 2 list in constant time. If a pair
(si, pj) is removed from M , then this is either because pj or lk is full. By Proposition
8, pj cannot subsequently become fully available. Thus, the removal of a pair cannot
change pj ’s fully available status. All that is required then is to check whether (si, pj)
was precarious, and update pj ’s precariousList and lk’s precariousProjList. If on
removing pair (si, pj), the last pointer now points to a tie with empty phase 1 and phase
2 lists, last needs to be updated and accordingly moves from right to left until it reaches
the end of a tie with a non-empty phase 1 or phase 2 list.
9. deciding if pj is precarious, and returning a precarious pair if one exists: Similar to Point
5 above but using the precariousList of pj .
10. Finding a worst assignee of pj according to lk and deciding if lk meta-prefers si to this
worst assignee: Similar to Point 6 above, this operation is only required if pj is full and
not precarious, at which point pj ’s last pointer will point to the rightmost position in
a tie in projectedPrefList such that lk’s current worst student assigned to pj , sw is
assigned at the same rank. As above retrieving sw and comparing its rank and phase
with si takes constant time.
Therefore, all operations inside the main while loop of Algorithm 1 run in constant
time. J
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Algorithm 5 gives a more detailed look at the processes involved in Algorithm 3. Proposi-
tion 21 shows that Algorithm 5 is has linear time complexity.
Algorithm 5 Promote-students(M) Removes all blocking pairs of type 3bi
Require: SPA-ST instance I and matching M which does not contain blocking pairs of
type (3a), (3bii) or (3c).
Ensure: Return a stable matching M .
1: create data structures as described in Proposition 21
2: while S 6= ∅ do
3: pop pj from stack S
4: remove the first student si from list ρj
5: let ρk =M(si)
6: if si prefers pk to pj then . pj is undersubscribed, si is assigned and prefers pj to
M(si)
7: M ←M\{(si, pk)}
8: M ←M ∪ {(si, pj)}
9: let ρk be the list of student and rank tuples associated with project M(si) and let
boolean βk indicate whether M(si) is on stack S
10: if ρk 6= ∅ then
11: push pk onto stack S if it is not already on S . using βk
12: end if
13: end if
14: if ρj 6= ∅ and pj is undersubscribed then
15: push pj onto stack S . pj cannot currently be on S
16: end if
17: end while
18: return M
I Proposition 21. The time complexity of Algorithm 5 is O(m) where m is the total length
of all students preference lists.
Proof. Abraham et al. [1] describes the process of a sequence of promotions for houses in
the ha problem in order to return a trade-in-free matching. A similar process is described
here to remove all blocking pairs of type (3bi). We create the following data structures.
A linked list ρj of students si for each project pj such that si is assigned in M , finds pj
acceptable. We may also start by assuming that ρj involves only students who prefer pj
to M(si), however the time complexity is unaffected by this.
A ranking list ri for each student si built as an array such that ri = j contains the rank
of pj for student si;
A stack S of undersubscribed projects pj , such that ρj is non-empty, is created;
A variable βj for each project pj which records whether pj is already in S.
These data structures can be initialised in O(m) time where m is the total length of all
student preference lists.
Execution of Algorithm 5 proceeds as follows. For each iteration of the while loop a
project pj is taken from stack S. Project pj must be undersubscribed and have non-empty
list ρj . The first tuple from ρj , (si, r) is removed and if si would prefer to be assigned to pj
than M(si) (found by comparing r and αi) then we remove pair (si,M(si)) from M and add
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Student si
prefList, (project, rank) tuples(p3, 1) (p2, 1) (p1, 1)
first second
projPosition3 2 1
phase of si1
firstFin, True if first pointer reaches end of tieF
secondFin, True if second pointer reaches end of tieF
Project pj
projectedPrefList,
(student, rank, boolean) tuples
last
(s7, 1, T) (s4, 1, F) (s6, 2, T)
studentPositionsnull 5 null
precariousListnull null null
supportListnull null s3
lecturer offering pjl5
number of allocations in M2
Lecturer lk
prefList, (student, rank, boolean) tuples(s8, 1, F) (s2, 2, T) (s3, 2, T)
last
studentPositionsnull 2 3
precariousProjListnull p2 null
number of allocations in M3
Matching M
matchArray, cell i− 1 contains pj if (si, pj) ∈M or null if si is unmatched
null p6 null
Key
boolean/int/link/tuple
Array
Doubly linked list embedded in
an array
Figure 5 Data structures guide for Lemma 20
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(si, pj), updating αi. Now, M(si) is certainly an undersubscribed project and it is added
to S (unless it already exists on S). Whether or not (si, pj) is added to M , pj may still be
undersubscribed. If ρj is non-empty and pj is undersubscribed, then pj is added to S.
With each iteration we remove a tuple from some project’s ρ list. These lists must be
finite because preference lists are finite and therefore Algorithm 5 will terminate with empty
S. It is clear that Algorithm 5 will take O(m) time where m is the total length of all students
preference lists. J
I Theorem 22. Algorithm 1 always terminates and runs in linear time with respect to the
total lengths of students’ preference lists.
Proof. By Proposition 19 each student can apply to a project on their preference list a
maximum of three times during the main while loop of Algorithm 1. Since all operations
within this while loop run in constant time by Proposition 20, this part of the algorithm must
run in O(3m) = O(m) time, where m is the sum of lengths of all students’ preference lists.
Proposition 21 shows that Algorithm 5 also runs in O(m) time, therefore so must Algorithm
1. Finally, since student preference lists are of finite length, Algorithm 1 must terminate. J
B.4 Performance guarantee
B.4.1 Preliminary definitions
The underlying graph G of an spa-st instance I consists of sets of student, project and
lecturer vertices. Edges exist between a student vertex si and a project vertex pj if si finds
pj acceptable. Edges exist between a project vertex pj and lecturer vertex lk if lk offers pj .
The mapped graph G′ of the underlying graph G of the spa-st instance I is created in
the following way. Let all student vertices remain unchanged. For each lecturer vertex lk we
create multiple cloned vertices l1k . . . l
rk
k , where rk = dk − |M(lk) ∩Mopt(lk)| and dk is lk’s
capacity. Let M be the matching found by Algorithm 1 for instance I and let Mopt be a
maximum stable matching in I. In G there are edges between students and projects, and
projects and lecturers, whereas G′ contains only edges between students and lecturer clones.
An (si, pj) edge in G corresponds to an (si, lrk) edge in G′, where lrk denotes the rth
lecturer clone of lecturer lk. Edges in G′ are given by M ′ and M ′opt, defined below. M ′opt
edges are defined as follows. For each lecturer lk, if Mopt\M(lk) = {si1 , ..., sit} then add
(sir , lrk), (1 ≤ r ≤ t) to M ′opt, the mapped version of Mopt in G′. M ′ edges are then added
using Algorithm 6. By using this algorithm we ensure that where possible, pairs of edges
in M ′ and M ′opt involving the same project are assigned to the same lecturer clone in G′.
According to Algorithm 6 we do the following. A copy of M\Mopt is created and denoted M0
which intuitively contains the set of student-project pairs that have not yet been mapped.
L0 is a copy of the set of all lecturer clone vertices, and L′0 is the empty set. Intuitively, L′0
will collect up any remaining lecturer clones, after pairs of edges in M ′ and M ′opt involving
the same project are dealt with. For each lecturer clone lrk ∈ L0, if there is an edge (si, lrk) in
M ′opt for some si then we let pj be the project assigned to si in Mopt. If there is not, then lrk
is added to L′0. Assuming (si, lrk) ∈ M ′opt, then we check if there is an edge (si′ , pj) in M0
for some student si′ . Again, if there is not then lrk is added to L′0. If (si′ , pj) ∈M0 for some
student si′ then we add edge (si′ , lrk) to M ′ and remove (si′ , pj) from M0. After all lecturer
clones have been tested, then for each student-project pair (si, pj) remaining in M0 we find
an unused lecturer clone lrk ∈ L′0, where lk offers pj , and add (si, lrk) to M ′. Project vertices
and all other edges are ignored in G′.
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Algorithm 6 Create-mapped(M), obtains a set of edges M ′ for the mapped graph G′
corresponding to edges in M\Mopt
Require: An instance I of spa-st, a stable matching M and maximum stable matching
Mopt of I and a mapped version M ′opt of Mopt.
Ensure: Return a mapped version M ′ of M\Mopt.
1: M0 ←M\Mopt . where M0 is the working set of student project pairs in M
2: let L0 be a copy of the set of all lecturer clones
3: L′0 ← ∅
4: M ′ ← ∅
5: while L0 is non-empty do
6: remove a lecturer clone lrk from L0
7: if (si, lrk) is an edge in M ′opt for some si then
8: let pj be the project assigned to si in Mopt
9: if (si′ , pj) is in M0 for some student si′ then
10: M ′ ←M ′ ∪ {(s′i, lrk)}
11: M0 ←M0\{(s′i, pj)}
12: else
13: L′0 ← L′0 ∪ {lrk}
14: end if
15: else
16: L′0 ← L′0 ∪ {lrk}
17: end if
18: end while
19: while M0 is non-empty do
20: pick some (si, pj) ∈M0
21: M0 ←M0\{(si, pj)}
22: let lrk be some lecturer clone in L′0, where lk offers pj . lrk must exist since there are
dk − |M(lk) ∩Mopt(lk)| clones for lk
23: L′0 ← L′0\{lrk}
24: M ′ ←M ′ ∪ {(si, lrk)}
25: end while
26: return M ′
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Student preferences:
s1: p1 p2 p3
s2: (p1 p2)
s3: (p3 p2)
s4: p3
Project details:
p1: lecturer l1, c1 = 2
p2: lecturer l2, c2 = 1
p3: lecturer l2, c3 = 1
Lecturer preferences:
l1: s1 s2
l2: (s2 s3) s4 s1
d1 = 2
d2 = 2
Figure 6 Example instance I of spa-st.
B.4.2 Example
This example demonstrates the creation of graph G′ from graph G and matchings M and
Mopt. Figure 6 shows example instance I of spa-st.
Let M = {(s1, p1), (s2, p2), (s3, p3)} and Mopt = {(s1, p1), (s2, p1), (s3, p2), (s4, p3)} be
stable matchings in I. Clearly, Mopt is also a maximum stable matching as all students are
assigned. Figure 7a shows the underlying graph G of instance I. To create the vertices
of G′, student vertices are copied, and multiple lecturer cloned vertices are created. For
lecturer vertices l1 and l2 in G with capacities of 2, we create l11, l21, l12 and l22 in G′. Using the
definition of M ′opt above, we obtain the edge set M ′opt = {(s2, l11), (s3, l12), (s4, l22)}. Figure 7b
shows a part built G′ with all M ′opt edges added.
Next M ′ is calculated using Algorithm 6. A copy of M\Mopt is created and denoted
M0 = {(s2, p2), (s3, p3)}. L0 = {l11, l21, l12, l22} is a copy of the set of all lecturer cloned vertices,
and L′0 is the empty set. We iterate through L0 as follows.
Lecturer clone l11 is removed from L0. Since there is an edge (s2, l11) ∈ M ′opt and s2 is
assigned p1 in Mopt, but (si′ , pj) /∈M0 for each student si′ , l11 is added to L′0;
Lecturer clone l21 is removed from L0. As there is no edge (si, l21) ∈M ′opt for any student
si, l21 is added to L′0;
Next lecturer clone l12 is removed from L0. There is an edge (s3, l12) ∈M ′opt, s3 is assigned
p2 in Mopt and there is an edge (s2, p2) ∈M0, hence (s2, l12) is added to M ′ and (s2, p2)
is removed from M0;
Using the same reasoning when the final lecturer clone l22 is removed from L0, (s3, l22) is
also added to M ′ and (s3, p3) is removed from M0.
As M0 is now empty, we do not enter the final while loop on Line 19 of Algorithm 6
therefore M ′ is now complete. Figure 7c shows the completed mapped graph G′ with edge
set M ′ ∪M ′opt.
B.4.3 Components in G′
An alternating path in G′ is defined as a path that comprises edges in Mopt and in M
alternately. A path or alternating path is described as even if there are an even number of
edges in the path, odd otherwise. Finally, an alternating cycle is a sequence of edges in Mopt
and M alternately, which forms a cycle.
A component c in G′ is defined as any maximal connected subgraph in G′. Figure 8
shows the possible component structures that may be found in G′ which are described in
more detail below. Let nc,l and nc,s denote the maximum number of lecturer clones and
students respectively, in some component c of G′, and let nc = max{nc,l, nc,s}. Notation
for a lecturer clone in component c is defined as lc,r indicating the rth lecturer clone of
component c. Similarly, sc,r indicates the rth student of component c.
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s1
s2
s3
s4
p1
p2
p3
l1
l2
(a) The underlying graph G.
M andMopt are shown in bold
and non-bold edges respect-
ively. Edges not in M ∪Mopt
are dashed.
s1
s2
s3
s4
l11
l21
l12
l22
(b) Part-built G′. All
student and lecturer clone
vertices are added. M ′opt =
{(s2, l11), (s3, l12), (s4, l22)}
edges are also shown.
s1
s2
s3
s4
l11
l21
l12
l22
(c) G′ with edge set
M ′ ∪ M ′opt, where M ′opt =
{(s2, l11), (s3, l12), (s4, l22)}
(non-bold edges) and
M ′ = {(s2, l12), (s3, l22)}
(bold edges) are shown.
Figure 7 Example illustrating the underlying graph G and mapped graph G′ relative to two
stable matchings M and Mopt in G.
Each vertex in G′ is incident to at most one M ′ edge and at most one M ′opt edge,
meaning every component must be a path or cycle comprising alternating M ′ and M ′opt
edges. Therefore the structure of each component must have one of the following forms.
(a) An alternating cycle;
(b) An even length alternating path, with lecturer clone end vertices;
(c) An even length alternating path, with student end vertices;
(d) An odd length alternating path, with end edges in M ;
(e) An odd length alternating path, with end edges in Mopt, for nc ≥ 3;
(f) An odd length alternating path, with end edges in Mopt, for nc = 2;
(g) An odd length alternating path, with end edges in Mopt, for nc = 1;
We wish to show that any stable matching found by Algorithm 1 must be at least 2/3
the size of Mopt.
B.4.4 Proofs
I Proposition 23. Let (si, lc,r) ∈ M ′opt be an edge in G′ where (si, pj) ∈ Mopt. If lc,r is
unmatched in M ′ or if there exists an edge (si′ , lc,r) ∈ M ′ where si′ is assigned a project
other than pj in M , then |Mopt(pj)| > |M(pj)|, and hence pj is undersubscribed in M .
Proof. Assume for contradiction that |Mopt(pj)| ≤ |M(pj)|. During the execution of Al-
gorithm 6, the first while loop iterates over the lecturer clones in G′ once. This means that
all edges in M ′opt corresponding to edges in Mopt(pj) are iterated over.
Let lc,r be the current lecturer clone being iterated over. We know that (si, lc,r) ∈M ′opt
where (si, pj) ∈Mopt. If there is an edge (si′ , pj) ∈M not yet mapped then we immediately
‘pair’ on this lecturer clone by adding edge (si′ , lc,r) to G′. Since |Mopt(pj)| ≤ |M(pj)|, there
are at least |Mopt(pj)| opportunities for these pairings to occur. Therefore, every lc,r′ clone
corresponding to an edge in Mopt(pj) must be assigned an additional edge in M ′ which itself
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sc,1
sc,2
sc,3
sc,γ
lc,1
lc,2
lc,3
lc,γ
(a)
sc,1
sc,2
sc,µ
lc,1
lc,2
lc,µ
lc,γ
(b)
sc,1
sc,2
sc,µ
sc,γ
lc,1
lc,2
lc,µ
(c)
sc,1
sc,2
sc,γ
lc,1
lc,2
lc,γ
(d)
sc,1
sc,2
sc,γ
lc,1
lc,2
lc,γ
(e) γ ≥ 3
sc,1
sc,2
lc,1
lc,2
(f) γ = 2
sc,1 lc,1
(g) γ = 1
Figure 8 The possible component structures in G′ for a component c, where γ = nc, the size of
the component, and µ = γ − 1. M ′ and M ′opt edges are shown in bold and non-bold, respectively.
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corresponds to an edge in M(pj). This provides the required contradiction to the assumption
that lc,r is unmatched in M ′ or (si′ , lc,r) ∈M ′ where si′ is assigned a project other than pj
in M . It follows immediately that pj is undersubscribed in M . J
I Proposition 24. Let (si, lc,r) ∈ M ′ be an edge in G′ where (si, pj) ∈ M . If there
exists an edge (si′ , lc,r) ∈ M ′opt where si′ is assigned a project other than pj in Mopt, then
|M(pj)| > |Mopt(pj)|, and hence pj is undersubscribed in Mopt.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that there exists an edge (si′ , lc,r) ∈ M ′opt where si′ is
assigned a project other than pj in Mopt and |M(pj′)| ≤ |Mopt(pj′)|.
When we iterate over the lecturer clones in the first while loop of Algorithm 6, if there
is an edge (si′ , pj′) ∈M not yet mapped then we immediately ‘pair’ on this lecturer clone.
Clearly all pairs of this type in M will be used up since there are only |M(pj′)| opportunities
for these pairings to occur. But since an edge (si′ , lc,r) ∈M ′ where si′ is assigned a project
pj′ this is not the case and we have our required contradiction. Hence pj′ is undersubscribed
in Mopt. J
I Proposition 25. Let c be the component of G′ in Figure 8f. Let sc,1 be assigned to project
pj in Mopt. Then project pj is fully available in M and, sc,1 and sc,2 can never have applied
to pj at any point in Algorithm 1’s execution.
Proof. Let lecturer clone lc,1 correspond to lecturer lk. In G′, lecturer clone lc,1 is unassigned
in M ′, therefore we know that lk is undersubscribed in M . Since there is no edge in M ′
incident to lc,1, by Proposition 23, we know pj is undersubscribed in M . Project pj is by
definition fully available inM and by Proposition 8 must have been fully available throughout
the algorithm’s execution.
Now we prove that neither sc,1 nor sc,2 can have applied to pj . In Algorithm 3 students
can only apply to projects that are not fully available by Proposition 9, hence we only look
at the main while loop of Algorithm 1. We consider sc,1 first. Assume for contradiction that
sc,1 applied to pj at some point during the main while loop of Algorithm 1’s execution. Then
(sc,1, pj) would be added to M as pj was always fully available. But we know that (sc,1, pj)
is not in the final matching M hence it must have been rejected by lk at some point. But
this can only have happened if pj was not fully available, which contradicts the fact that pj
is always fully available above. Therefore sc,1 can never have applied to pj at any point. By
identical reasoning sc,2 can also never have applied to pj . J
I Proposition 26. Suppose that student si applied to project pj in phase 2 of Algorithm 1
and denote this time by T0. Then at time T0, pj is not fully available and is non-precarious.
Proof. Let lk be the lecturer offering pj . Assume for contradiction that pj is fully available
at T0. Since si is applying to pj in phase 2, lk must have rejected si when si was in phase 1.
But this can only happen if pj is not fully available and by Proposition 8, pj cannot again
become fully available.
Assume then that pj is precarious at T0. Then there must exist a precarious pair (si′ , pj)
in the matching for some student si′ . We know from Proposition 10 that when a project is
not fully available and non-precarious, it cannot again become precarious. Therefore, when
si applied in phase 1 to pj , it was either fully available or precarious (or both), and so (si, pj)
must have been added to the matching. But at some point before T0, since si is applying
in phase 2, (si, pj) was removed from the matching. This can only happen when pj is not
fully available and either (si, pj) is precarious or is a worst student in M(pj) (also a worst
assignee of M(lk)).
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If (si, pj) is precarious then, once removed, si would again apply to pj in phase 1 and
must be successfully added for the same reason as before, although this time as a non-
precarious pair (since other fully available projects tied with pj on si’s list would be applied
to by si before pj). The removal of non-precarious (si, pj) can only happen because pj is
non-precarious which contradicts the assumption that pj is precarious at T0 by Proposition
10, since pj is also not fully available. Therefore pj is non-precarious at T0.
Therefore pj can be neither fully available nor precarious at T0. J
I Proposition 27. Let T0 denote the point in Algorithm 1’s execution at the end of the main
while loop. If a project pj offered by lk is full and non-precarious before T0, then a student
si worse than or equal to lk’s worst ranked assignees in M(pj) cannot subsequently become
assigned to pj.
Proof. We know that a student worse than or equal to lk’s worst ranked assignees in M(pj)
cannot become assigned to pj before T0 by Proposition 13. It remains to strengthen this
statement to be true for the rest of the algorithm.
After T0, if there is a blocking pair associated with a student assigned to pj then by
Propositions 15 and 16 we know that at T0, M(pj) must contain one of the worst students
in M(lk). Therefore, the only way a worse ranked student could become assigned to pj after
T0 is if pj is undersubscribed at T0.
But this would mean that there was some point T1 before T0 and after pj was full and
non-precarious, that pj became undersubscribed by the removal of (si, pj) for some student
si. Denote this point as T2. The removal of (si, pj) occurring at T2 can only have happened
if lk was full, non-precarious (since we are removing a non-precarious pair) and lk preferred
some other student si′ to si. But by Proposition 13 lk cannot assign to a worse student after
this point. Therefore lk cannot subsequently assign to a worse student than si (the worst
student in M(pj) when pj was full). J
I Lemma 28. Let M be a stable matching found by Algorithm 1 for instance I of spa-st,
and let Mopt be a maximum stable matching in I. No component of the type given in Figure
8f can exist in the mapped graph G′.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that there is a component c of the type shown in Figure 8f
in G′. Let pj be the project assigned to sc,1 in M ′opt in Figure 8f.
We look at the possible configurations in G that could map to c in G′. Lecturer clones
lc,1 and lc,2 may or may not be the same lecturer in G. It may also be the case that sc,1
and sc,2 are assigned to the same or different projects in M ′ and M ′opt, respecting the fact
that projects may only be offered by one lecturer. Let sc,1 = si and sc,2 = si′ . Figure 9
shows the possible configurations in G relating to c in G′. They are found by noting that
all configurations in G must have: 2 students; 1 or 2 lecturers; between 2 and 3 projects;
student si′ must be unassigned in M ; and si′ must be assigned a project of the same lecturer
in Mopt as si is in M . Note that it is not possible for there to be only one project pj in the
configuration since si would be assigned to pj in both M and M ′opt, meaning (si, pj) would
not exist in Mopt\M or M\Mopt and so neither of the edges from sc,1 would exist in G′, a
contradiction.
We now show that none of the subgraphs shown in Figure 9 can occur in a matching M
with respect to G found using Algorithm 1. Assume for contradiction that one does occur.
We consider each type of subgraph separately.
(a) Students si and si′ are assigned to pj and pj′ in Mopt respectively, and si is assigned to
pj′ in M . Lecturer lk offers both pj and pj′ .
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si
si′
pj
pj′
lk
(a)
si
si′
pj
pj′
lk
(b)
si
si′
pj
pj′
pj′′
lk
(c)
si
si′
pj
pj′
lk
lk′
(d)
si
si′
pj
pj′
lk
lk′
(e)
si
si′
pj
pj′
pj′′
lk
lk′
(f)
Figure 9 The possible configurations in G for an alternating path of size 3 in G′ with M ′opt end
edges. M and Mopt are shown in bold and non-bold edges respectively. Any project and lecturer
vertices shown may have additional assignments involving other vertices not shown in the graphs.
There are three sub-cases to consider.
i. si strictly prefers pj to pj′ : If si prefers pj to M(si) then si must have applied to
pj at least once. But this contradicts Proposition 25.
ii. pj and pj′ are tied on si’s preference list: Project pj is fully available in the finalised
matching M by Proposition 25 and has always been fully available by Proposition
8. As there is a fully available project tied with pj′ on si’s list, once edge (si, pj′) is
added to M , as long as it remains, it must be precarious. Pair (si, pj′) cannot be
removed at any stage before the end of the main while loop, since doing so would
mean si would apply to pj before again applying to pj′ (since pj is fully available)
contradicting Proposition 25. Also Algorithm 3 cannot change the allocations of
any precarious lecturer by Proposition 11. Therefore Algorithm 1 must terminate
with (si, pj′) as a precarious pair.
Student si′ must have applied to pj′ in phase 2 since they are unassigned in the
finalised matching M . By Proposition 26, at the point of application, pj′ is not
fully available and is non-precarious. But by Proposition 10 pj′ cannot subsequently
become precarious and so the algorithm will terminate with a non-precarious pj′ ,
contradicting the above.
iii. si strictly prefers pj′ to pj : We consider three further sub-cases based on lk’s
preference list.
1. lk strictly prefers si to si′ : We know that si strictly prefers pj′ to pj and that
lk strictly prefers si to si′ . But then (si, pj′) forms a blocking pair of stable
matching Mopt, a contradiction.
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2. si′ and si are tied on lk’s preference list: Project pj is fully available in M by
Proposition 25 and has always been fully available by Proposition 8. Student si
must have been assigned to pj′ in phase 1, otherwise si would have applied to
pj , contradicting Proposition 25. Student si′ must have applied to pj′ in phase 2
since si′ is unassigned in M . Denote the point at which si′ applies to pj′ in phase
2 as T0. By Proposition 26, at T0, pj′ is not fully available and is non-precarious.
By Proposition 10, pj′ remains non-precarious from time T0 until the algorithm’s
termination. Regardless of whether (si, pj′) exists in the matching at time T0,
we know from time T0, (si, pj′) cannot be removed from M , otherwise si would
remove pj′ from their preference list (as pj′ is not precarious) contradicting the
fact that si assigned to pj′ in phase 1.
We consider the following two possibilities.
si′ applied to pj′ in phase 2 before pair (si, pj′) was added: Assume si′ is
unsuccessful in its application at T0. From above we know that pj′ remains
non-precarious from T0 onwards.
If pj′ is undersubscribed at time T0, then lk cannot be precarious (as si′ was
rejected) and so lk does not meta-prefer si′ to its worst assignee sw ∈M(lk).
Lecturer lk must be full at this point since pj′ is not fully available and is
undersubscribed. As lk is full and must remain non-precarious by Proposition
10, after T0, it is only possible for lk to improve their allocations, by
Proposition 13. Since lk meta-prefers si′ to si (si′ is in phase 2), when si
applies to pj′ , si must also be rejected. Project pj′ is not precarious and so
si must remove pj′ from their list, contradicting the fact that si must be
assigned to pj′ in phase 1.
If pj′ is full at T0 then we know lk does not meta-prefer si′ to its worst
assignee sw in M(pj′). By Proposition 13, pj′ cannot accept worse assign-
ments than are currently inM(pj′) until after the main while loop, therefore
when si applies to pj′ before the main while loop as in the previous case
they must also be rejected, a contradiction as above.
Assume therefore that si′ is successful in their application at T0. Pair (si′ , pj′)
must be removed at some point after T0 since (si′ , pj′) /∈M . Denote the time
(si′ , pj′) is removed as T1. The removal at T1 must have occurred before the
end of the main while loop since otherwise si′ would be assigned to some
project in the finalised matching M , a contradiction (the same students are
assigned when removing blocking pairs of type (3bi)). We know that (si, pj′)
was added either after T0 and before T1 or after T1. Once added (si, pj′) cannot
be removed from above.
Assume (si, pj′) was added before T1. At T1 (before the end of the main
while loop) pair (si′ , pj′) is removed. This must either be because pj′ is
undersubscribed and lk is full, or because pj′ is full.
∗ If the former then lk is full and cannot be precarious since we are removing
a non-precarious pair (pj′ is non-precarious after T0). But this removal
can only happen if si′ is the worst student assigned to lk at T1. But by
the definition of a worst assignee si (being in phase 1) would be removed
before si′ . Therefore, (si, pj′) must have already been removed from the
matching, a contradiction to the fact that (si, pj′) cannot be removed.
∗ Using similar reasoning, if pj′ is full at T1, then (as we are removing a
non-precarious pair), si′ must be the worst student assigned in M(pj′).
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But this would mean (si, pj′) had already been removed, a contradiction.
Assume (si, pj′) was added after T1. Again we consider 2 sub-cases.
∗ If pj′ was undersubscribed at time T1, then lk must have been full and
must be non-precarious since non-precarious pair (si′ , pj′) was removed.
This pair was removed as si′ was a worst student in lk at T1. By
Proposition 10, lk remains non-precarious from this point onwards and
therefore by Proposition 13, lk can only improve their allocations from
time T1. Therefore, as lk meta-prefers si′ to si (as si′ is in phase 2), it
must be that si, applying after T1, will be rejected. This would result in
the removal of pj′ from si’s list contradicting the fact that si assigned to
pj′ in phase 1.
∗ If pj′ is full at T1 then using similar reasoning to above, we know that
at T1, si′ is a worst assignee in M(pj′). Since, at T1, pj′ is full and non-
precarious, and remains non-precarious, by Proposition 13, pj′ cannot
subsequently accept a worse assignee until the end of the main while loop.
Therefore si will be rejected on application, a contradiction as above.
si′ applied to pj′ in phase 2 after pair (si, pj′) was added: Since lk meta-prefers
si′ to si, (si′ , pj′) must be added to the matching with some student other
than si′ being removed. But now we are in the same position as before where
(si′ , pj′) must be removed from M , but this can only happen if (si, pj′) is
removed first, a contradiction.
3. lk strictly prefers si′ to si: Since si′ is unassigned in M , (si′ , pj′) is a blocking
pair of stable matching M , a contradiction.
(b) Students si and si′ are both assigned to the same project pj in Mopt and si is assigned
to project pj′ in M . Both pj and pj′ are offered by lecturer lk. Since si′ is unassigned in
M , we know that si′ has to have applied to pj during the algorithm’s execution, but this
directly contradicts Proposition 25.
(c) Students si and si′ are assigned to pj and pj′′ in Mopt and si is assigned to pj′ in M .
Lecturer lk offers pj , pj′ and pj′′ . By Proposition 23 pj′′ is undersubscribed in M since
lecturer clone lc,2 in Figure 8f has two edges corresponding to different projects in M and
Mopt. We know that lk is undersubscribed in M by Proposition 25 and so pj′′ must also
be fully available. By Proposition 8 we know that pj′′ has always been fully available
during the algorithm’s execution. Since si′ is unassigned in M they must have applied
to pj′′ during the course of the algorithm. But as pj′′ has always been fully available
this must have been accepted. As we end up with si′ being unassigned it must also be
the case that lk rejects pair (si′ , pj′′) but we know that pj′′ is always fully available and
so this cannot have happened, a contradiction.
(d) Students si and si′ are assigned to pj and pj′ in Mopt and si is assigned to pj′ in M .
Lecturers lk and lk′ offer projects pj and pj′ , respectively. Identical arguments to those
found in Case aai and aaii can be used to show a contradiction. Similarly, identical
arguments to those found in Case aaiii can also be used to show a contradiction, but
exchanging lk for lk′ .
(e) Students si and si′ are both assigned to project pj in Mopt and si is assigned to project
pj′ in M . Projects pj and pj′ are offered by lecturers lk and lk′ respectively. Using
identical arguments to Case b, as student si′ is unassigned in M , they must have applied
to pj during the algorithm’s execution, but this contradicts Proposition 25.
SEA 2018
8:42 A 32 -approximation algorithm for the Student-Project Allocation problem
(f) Students si and si′ are assigned to pj and pj′′ in Mopt and si is assigned to pj′ in M .
Lecturer lk offers project pj , whereas lk′ offer projects pj′ and pj′′ . We consider the
following 3 sub-cases.
i. si strictly prefers pj to pj′ : Identical arguments to those found in Case aai can be
used to show a contradiction.
ii. pj and pj′ are tied on si’s preference list: Using similar reasoning to Case aaii we
know that once edge (si, pj′) is added to M it is, and remains, a precarious pair
and cannot be removed at any stage. Also pj′ must have been fully available on
application by si otherwise fully available pj at the same rank would have been
applied to by si. Therefore pj′ is either fully available or precarious throughout the
algorithm’s execution. Student si′ is not assigned in M and so must have applied
to pj′′ whilst they were in phase 2. Let this time of application be denoted T0. By
Proposition 26, pj′′ cannot be precarious at T0.
If pj′ is fully available at T0 then lk′ is undersubscribed and so si′ would only be
rejected if pj′′ was not precarious, full and si′ was not meta-preferred by lk′ to
an student in M(pj′′).
If pj′ is precarious at T0 then lk′ is also precarious and therefore si′ would again
only be rejected if pj′′ was not precarious, full and si′ was not meta-preferred by
lk′ to an student in M(pj′′).
Therefore we have the following two cases.
1. If si′ was rejected then it must be because pj′′ was not precarious, full and si′
was not meta-preferred by lk′ to any student in M(pj′′), by above. But similar to
Case c we can say that by Proposition 23, pj′′ is undersubscribed in the finalised
matching M . Therefore, at least one non-precarious pair involved with pj′′ must
be removed (without a pair involving pj′′ immediately replacing it) before the
end of the algorithm. Denote this point in the algorithm’s execution as T1 and
the removed pair (si′′ , pj′′) for some student si′′ . Note T1 may either be before of
after the end of the main while loop. This type of removal can only happen when
lk′ is full (this is clear before the main while loop, and is true after the main while
loop by Proposition 7), and once a lecturer is full they remain full (since any pair
deletion involving a project of lk′ can only occur with a pair addition involving
a project of lk′). But (si, pj′) was assigned when pj′ was fully available and so
(si, pj′) was assigned before T1. If T1 occurs after the end of the main while
loop then lk′ must be non-precarious at T1 by Proposition 11. But this means
precarious pair (si, pj′) must have been removed before T1, a contradiction to the
fact that (si, pj′) can never be removed. Therefore the removal of (si′′ , pj′′) at T1
must have occurred before the end of the main while loop. But, since (si, pj′) is
precarious, it would be removed before non-precarious (si′′ , pj′′), a contradiction.
2. If si′ was accepted then pair (si′ , pj′′) would need to be removed before the
algorithm terminated (since (si′ , pj′′) /∈ M). We know from before that pj′′ is
non-precarious at the point of application and further that pair (si′ , pj′′) must
remain non-precarious by definition since si′ applied in phase 2. Therefore, we
need to remove non-precarious pair (si′ , pj′′) from the matching which can only
happen if either pj′′ is full or lk′ is full. Firstly assume that pj′′ is full and pair
(si′ , pj′′) is replaced with a meta-preferred student assigned to pj′′ (pj′′ must be
non-precarious since we are removing a non-precarious pair). Since pj′′ needs to
be undersubscribed in the finalised matching M we are in the same position and
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contradiction as the previous case. Secondly, lk′ is full (and therefore remains
full), in which case pair (si, pj′) must already have been assigned and, as above,
should be removed before pair (si′ , pj′′), a contradiction.
iii. si strictly prefers pj′ to pj : We now consider three sub-cases based on lk′ ’s preference
list.
1. lk′ strictly prefers si to si′ : We know that pj′ is undersubscribed in Mopt by
Proposition 24. Therefore as lk′ strictly prefers si to si′ and si strictly prefers pj′
to pj , (si, pj′) is a blocking pair of stable Mopt, a contradiction.
2. si′ and si are tied on lk′ ’s preference list: For this initial paragraph we use some
similar reasoning to Case aaiiia(iii)2. Student si must have assigned to pj′ in
phase 1, otherwise si would have applied to pj a contradiction to Proposition 25.
Unlike Case aaiiia(iii)2, pj′ may be precarious at this point of application. Also,
student si′ , not being assigned in M , must have applied to pj′′ whilst in phase
2. Denote the point at which si′ applies to pj′′ in phase 2 as T0. At T0 we know
that pj′′ is not fully available and not precarious by Proposition 26 and that pj′′
remains non-precarious from this point onwards by Proposition 10.
We look at two possibilities:
A. si′ was rejected at T0. There would be two possible reasons for the rejection.
Firstly, that lk′ is non-precarious, full and lk′ does not meta-prefer si′ to any
student in M(lk′). Secondly, that pj′′ is non-precarious, full and lk′ does not
meta-prefer si′ to any student in M(pj′′). We can rule out the first option as
follows. If lk′ is non-precarious and full at T0 then by Proposition 13, lk′ cannot
accept a worse student than currently exists in M(lk′) for the remainder of the
algorithm. Since si′ was rejected we can conclude that no worse student than
si′ can exist in M(lk′) at T0 and cannot exist in M(lk′) from T0 onwards. But
si′ being in phase 2 is meta-preferred to si in phase 1. This contradicts the fact
that (si, pj′) ∈M . Therefore, si′ was rejected because pj′′ is non-precarious,
full and lk′ does not meta-prefer si′ to any student in M(pj′′). By Proposition
27, lk′ cannot accept a student to project pj′′ that is worse or equal to a worst
student existing in M(pj′′) for the remainder of the algorithm.
Using a similar strategy to Case ffii, we know that pj′′ is undersubscribed in
the finalised matching M by Proposition 23, therefore before the algorithm
terminates a pair (si′′ , pj′′) involving pj′′ must be removed without being
immediately replaced with another pair involving pj′′ . Denote the first such
occurrence as happening at time T1, where T1 occurs after T0. Note that T1
may be either before or after the end of the main while loop.
Assume T1 occurs before the end of the main while loop. We know any
removal of the type occurring at T1 must be due to lk being full. By
Proposition 13, we know lk′ cannot be subsequently assigned in M a worse
student than exists in the matching at T1. Using the same proposition we
know that pj′′ cannot be assigned in M a worse student until the end of
the main while loop than exists in the matching at T0.
Since a pair involving pj′′ was removed at T1, a worst assignee in M(lk′) at
T1 can be no worse than a worst assignee in M(pj′′) at T0. Finally, this
means that no student assigned to lk′ from T1 onwards can be worse than si′
rejected at T0, but si being in phase 1 is worse than si′ in phase 2 according
to lk′ , a contradiction to the fact that (si, pj′) ∈M .
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Assume therefore that T1 occurs after the end of the main while loop. Then
si has to be assigned to pj′ at this point. Since pj′′ becomes undersubscribed
at T1, pair (si′′ , pj′′) must be a blocking pair of type (3bi). By Propositions
15 and 16, si′′ must be a worst student inM(lk′) and thereforeM(pj′′). But,
we also know that at T0 when si′ was rejected, lk′ could not subsequently
accept a student to project pj′′ that is worse or equal to a worst student
existing in M(pj′′) for the remainder of the algorithm, by Proposition 27.
Therefore, si′′ cannot be worse than si′ according to lk′ . Recall that (si, pj)
was assigned in phase 1 and so must exist in the matching at T1. This
means that si′′ is either at an equal rank to si (as the rank of si and si′
are equal) but is in phase 2 with si being in phase 1, or si′′ is at a higher
rank than si. In either case si′′ is not a worst student in M(lk′) at T1, a
contradiction to the fact that si′′ must be a worst student in M(lk′) at T1.
B. si′ application to pj′′ was accepted at T0. Pair (si′ , pj′′) does not exist in the
finalised matching M and therefore must be removed sometime after T0. We
know (si′ , pj′′) is always non-precarious by definition (as si′ applied in phase
2) and hence is removed as a non-precarious pair. Since si′ is unassigned in
the finalised matching M and Algorithm 3 cannot change which students are
assigned, (si′ , pj′′) must be removed before the end of the main while loop.
Denote this time as T2.
This can only happen if either lk′ is full and si′ is a worst assignee in M(lk′)
or pj′′ is full and si′ is a worst assignee in M(pj′′). If the former, then by
Proposition 13, lk′ cannot accept a worse student than a current worst student
in M(lk′). This worst student cannot be worse than si′ , since si′ was just
removed, hence si cannot be assigned a project of lk′ ’s in the finalised matching
M , a contradiction. Therefore at T2, pj′′ is full and si′ is removed as a worst
assignee in M(pj′′). From T2 onwards, no student worse than a worse student
in M(pj′′) can be assigned to pj′′ by Proposition 27.
But since pj′′ must be undersubscribed in the finalised matching M by Propos-
ition 23, we can now use almost identical arguments as in case ffiiif(iii)2f(iii)2A
to show a contradiction, noting that T2 replaces T0 and si′ was removed rather
than rejected.
3. lk′ strictly prefers si′ to si: Project pj′′ is undersubscribed in M by Proposition
23. Therefore, as lk′ strictly prefers si′ to si and si′ strictly prefers pj′′ to being
unsubscribed, (si′ , pj′′) is a blocking pair of stable M , a contradiction.
Therefore it is not possible for a component structured as in Figure 8f to exist in G′. J
I Lemma 29. Let M be a stable matching found by Algorithm 1 for instance I of spa-st,
and let Mopt be a maximum stable matching in I. No component of the type given in Figure
8g can exist in the mapped graph G′.
Proof. Let pj be the project that student sc,1 is assigned to in Mopt and let lecturer clone
lc,1 correspond to lecturer lk in G. lk must be undersubscribed in M as there is a lecturer
clone lc,1 unassigned in G′. Also, by Proposition 23, pj must also be undersubscribed in M .
Therefore, pj is fully available at the end of the algorithm’s execution and must always have
been fully available by Proposition 8.
Student si is unassigned in M and so we know that si has to have applied to pj during
the algorithm’s execution. Since pj has always been fully available this had to have been
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Student preferences:
s1: (p3 p2)
s2: p3
s3: p3 p2 p1
Project details:
p1: lecturer l1, c1 = 2
p2: lecturer l1, c2 = 1
p3: lecturer l2, c3 = 1
Lecturer preferences:
l1: s1 s3
l2: s1 s2 s3
d1 = 2
d2 = 1
Figure 10 Example instance I of spa-st in which Algorithm 1 finds a stable matching 23 the size
of optimal.
accepted. Now, (si, pj) is not in the finalised matching M and so it must have been removed
and this could only have happened if pj or lk were full. But this contradicts the fact that pj
has always been fully available. Therefore, no component of type g can exist in the mapped
graph G′. J
I Theorem 30. Let M be a stable matching found by Algorithm 1 for instance I of spa-st,
and let Mopt be a maximum stable matching in I. Then matching |M | ≥ 32 |Mopt|.
Proof. Let G′ be the mapped graph constructed from the underlying graph of the instance
G. Components in G′ may only exist in the forms shown in Figure 8. Therefore we need
only show that no component in G′ can exist where the number of M ′ edges is less than 2/3
of the number of M ′opt edges. We run through each component of Figure 8 in turn. Let the
current component be denoted c, where M ′(c) and M ′opt(c) denote the set of edges in M ′
and M ′opt involved in c, respectively.
For Case 8a, an alternating cycle, and Cases 8b and 8c, alternating paths of even length,
it is clear that |M ′(c)| = |M ′opt(c)|. Case 8d involves an odd length alternating path with
end edges in M ′. It must be the case therefore that |M ′(c)| > |M ′opt(c)| for components of
this type. Case 8e shows an odd length alternating path with end edges in M ′opt, but for
path sizes greater than 5. Therefore, |M ′(c)| ≥ 23 |M ′opt(c)| as required. Neither Case 8f nor
8g can exist in G′ by Lemmas 28 and 29 respectively.
Hence it is not possible for the mapped graph G′ to contain components in which
|M ′(c)| < 23 |M ′opt(c)|. Algorithm 1 is therefore 3/2-approximating to a maximum stable
matching in I. J
B.5 Lower bound for Algorithm 1
Figure 10 shows instance I of spa-st. A maximum stable matching M ′ in I is given by
M ′ = {(s1, p2), (s2, p3), (s3, p1)}. The only possible blocking pairs for this matching are
(s3, p3) and (s3, p2). Neither pair can be a blocking pair since l2 prefers both of their current
assignees to s3.
A trace is given as Table 7 which shows the execution run of Algorithm 1 over instance I.
The algorithm outputs stable matching M = {(s1, p3), (s3, p2)}. The possible blocking pairs
of this matching are (s2, p3) and (s3, p3). Neither can be a blocking pair since l2 prefers s1
to both s2 and s3.
Therefore, Algorithm 1 has found a stable matching that is exactly 23 the size of the
maximum stable matching, thus algorithm cannot guarantee a better bound than 23 .
C IP model proofs
I Lemma 2. Let I be an instance of SPA-ST and let M be a matching in I. Then M is
stable if and only if the following condition, referred to as condition (*) holds: For each
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Action s1 s2 s3
1 s1 applies p3, accepted p3
2 s2 applies p3, accepted p3
3 s3 applies p3, rejected, p3 pref removed by s3 p3
4 s3 applies p2, accepted p3 p2
5 s1 applies p3, accepted, p3 pref removed by s2 p3 p2
6 s2 moves to phase 2 p3 p2
7 s2 applies p3, rejected, p3 pref removed by s2 p3 p2
8 s2 moves to phase 3 p3 p2
Table 7 Trace of running Algorithm 1 for instance I in Figure 10.
student si ∈ S and project pj ∈ P , if si is unassigned in M and finds pj acceptable, or si
prefers pj to M(si), then either:
lk is full, si /∈ M(lk) and lk prefers the worst student in M(lk) to si or is indifferent
between them, or;
pj is full and lk prefers the worst student in M(pj) to si or is indifferent between them,
where lk is the lecturer offering pj.
Proof. Suppose M is stable. Assume for contradiction that condition (*) is not satisfied.
Then there exists a student si ∈ S and a project pj ∈ P such that si is unassigned in M and
finds pj acceptable, or si prefers pj to M(si), and one of the following four cases arises:
1. pj and lk are both undersubscribed;
2. pj is undersubscribed, lk is full and si ∈M(lk);
3. pj is undersubscribed, lk is full and lk prefers si to the worst student in M(lk);
4. pj is full and lk prefers si to the worst student in M(pj).
Each of these scenarios clearly describes a blocking pair as in Section 2, hence we have a
contradiction to the stability of M .
Conversely, assume M satisfies condition (*). Suppose for contradiction that M is not
stable. Then, there exists a blocking pair (si, pj), implying that si is unassigned in M and
finds pj acceptable, or si prefers pj to M(si), and one of the above four cases will be true.
Whichever one of these cases holds, we then obtain a contradiction to the fact that the
conditions given in the statement of the theorem holds. Thus M is stable. J
A proof of correctness for the IP model is now given.
I Theorem 31. Given an instance I of spa-st, let J be the IP model as defined in Figure 1.
A stable matching in I corresponds to a feasible matching in J and vice versa.
Proof. Assume instance I of spa-st contains a stable matching M . We construct a feasible
solution to J involving the variables x, α and β as follows.
The variables x, α and β are constructed as follows. For each student si ∈ S and for
each project pj ∈ P , if si is assigned to pj in M then we set variable xij = 1, otherwise
xij = 0. Let lecturer lk be the proposer of project pj . Let variable αij = 1 if the following
two conditions hold: i) student si is not assigned to lecturer lk, and ii) lecturer lk is full and
prefers their worst ranked assignee to si, or is indifferent between them. Else let αij = 0. Let
variable βij = 1 if the following two conditions hold: i) student si is not assigned to project
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pj , and ii) project pj is full, and lk prefers pj ’s worst assignee to si, or is indifferent between
them. Else, set βij = 0.
Now it must be shown that all constraints described in Figure 1 are satisfied.
1. Constraints 1 - 4. It is clear by the construction of J that Constraints 1-4 are satisfied.
2. Constraint 5. Recall Sij = {pr ∈ P : rank(si, pr) ≤ rank(si, pj)} is the set of projects
ranked at least as highly as pj in si’s preference list. Let γij = 1−
∑
pr∈Sij xir. We must
show that whenever γij = 1, αij + βij ≥ 1. Assume γij = 1, that is si is unassigned or
would prefer to be assigned to pj than to M(pj). As M is stable we know that condition
(*) of Lemma 2 is satisfied. Therefore αij+βij ≥ 1 by construction. This directly satisfies
Constraint 5.
3. Constraint 6. Recall that for student si and lecturer lk, Tik is the set of students ranked
at least as highly as student si in lecturer lk’s preference list, not including si. Assume
αij = 1. Then, by definition, we know that lecturer lk is full and prefers their worst
ranked assignee to si, or is indifferent between them. Therefore, the LHS of the inequality
must equal dk and so this constraint is satisfied.
4. Constraint 7. Recall that Tijk is the set of students ranked at least as highly as student
si in lecturer lk’s preference list, such that the project pj is acceptable to each student.
Similar to above, assume βij = 1. Then, by definition, we know that project pj is full
and lk prefers their worst ranked assignee in M(pj) to si, or is indifferent between them.
Therefore, the LHS of the inequality must equal cj and so this constraint is also satisfied.
We have shown that the assignment of values to x, α and β satisfy all the constraints in
J , thus if there is a stable matching M in I, then there is a feasible solution of J .
Conversely, we now show that a feasible solution of J corresponds to a stable matching
M in I. Let x, α and β be a feasible solution of J . For each xij variable in J , if xij = 1
then add pair (si, pj) to M in I. It is now shown that this assignment of students to projects
satisfies the definition of a stable matching M in I.
1. The following constraints are clearly satisfied by Constraints 1-4:
A student si may be assigned to a maximum of 1 project.
A student si may only be assigned to a project that they find acceptable.
The number of students assigned to project pj is less than or equal to cj.
The number of students assigned to projects offered by lecturer lk is less than or equal
to dk.
2. M is stable. Assume for contradiction that there exists a blocking pair (si, pj) ∈ M .
Then by Lemma 2, neither of the sub-conditions of condition (*) can be true. Both of
these sub-conditions being false imply that, as Constraints 6 and 7 must be satisfied,
αij = 0 and βij = 0.
Recall γij = 1 −
∑
pr∈Sij xir.
∑
pr∈Sij xir is the number of projects that student si is
assigned to at a higher or equal ranking than pj in si’s preference list (including pj). Since
(si, pj) is a blocking pair, then it must be the case that
∑
pr∈Sij xir = 0. But this forces
γij = 1, and we know that αij and βij are equal to 0 so Constraint 5 is contradicted.
We have shown that if there is a feasible solution of x, α and β of J , then there is a
stable matching M in I. This completes the proof. J
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I Corollary 32. 3 Given an instance I of spa-st, let J be the IP model as defined in Figure
1. A maximum stable matching in I corresponds to an optimal solution in J and vice versa.
Proof. Assume M is a maximum stable matching in I. Let f = 〈x,α,β〉 be the solution
in J constructed according to the description in Theorem 31. We must show that f forms
an optimal solution of J . Firstly, since M is stable, we know by Theorem 31 that f is a
feasible solution of J . Suppose for contradiction that f is not optimal. Then there is some
solution g = 〈x′,α′,β′〉 of J in which obj(g) > obj(f), where obj(f ′) gives the objective
value of f ′. But by construction, g would translate into a stable matching M ′ such that
|M ′| = obj(g) > obj(f) = |M | in I contradicting the fact that M is maximum.
Conversely, assume f = 〈x,α,β〉 is an optimal solution in J , and let M be the stable
matching in I constructed according to the description in Theorem 31. Suppose for con-
tradiction that there is some stable matching M ′ in I such that |M ′| > |M |. Then by
construction, there must be some corresponding solution g = 〈x′,α′,β′〉 of J such that
obj(g) = |M ′| > |M | = obj(f), giving the required contradiction. J
3 Corollary 32 is identical to Theorem 3 in the main body of the paper.
